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Abstract 
 
The effects of education and on-the-job training on the performance of professional 
baseball players was studied using a secondary dataset consisting of 112 players and five 
years of play at the Major League level, classified as hitters from the 1990 through 2000 
seasons. The study revealed that higher education significantly shortened the time to 
reach the Major Leagues, while both education and on-the-job training did not 
significantly affect the offensive performance as measured by five commonly used 
measures: batting average (AVG) runs batted in (RBI), on base percentage (OBP), 
slugging (SLG), and on base + slugging (OPS). The results also demonstrated that a few 
offensive performance measures significantly affected career length in the major leagues, 
while other factors (age, education, team drafted, round drafted, performance statistics 
(AVG, OPS, and years in the minors) did not significantly affect the survival time in 
Major League Baseball. The findings suggested that the personnel in charge of player 
evaluation and MLB the general managers should fully explore a player's potential by 
multiple factors instead of using a generic strategy that is merely based on the generally 
accepted standard operating process rooted in the history of MLB. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the relationship between 
education and player development and the effects of each on the outcomes of the early 
stages of a professional baseball player’s career.  The early stages of career for the 
purpose of this study were defined as those years of service carried out between seasons 
one and five after being called up to the major league.  The intent was to (1) examine the 
offensive performance statistics of position players who were called up to the major 
league by conducting a comparative analysis of the differences in human capital between 
players who made the choice to attend college and those who made the decision to bypass 
college and immediately enter professional baseball after high school, and (2) how these 
choices affected their future Major League Baseball (MLB) performance.  The primary 
method of accomplishing this was to utilize two variables that measured one’s human 
capital: first, education, (high school only, junior college or four-year college) and 
second, on-the-job training.  On-the-job training was measured by using the number of 
years in college and in the minor league.  The objective was to determine what types of 
human capital contributed to the player’s professional baseball career once they were 
called up to the major league and whether the human capital an amateur baseball player 
received had an effect on any portion of the first five seasons of his major league career 
while he was still restricted by the reserve clause and not eligible for free agency.   
It was outside the scope of this dissertation to examine all players initially drafted 
and to measure their offensive contribution to their minor league club because only a 
fraction of these players would ever be called up to begin a MLB career. Therefore, this 
research only considered those players who were actually selected by a team through the 
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official draft of MLB and then called up from the minor league to the major league.  
Moreover, by only considering those players who were called up to the major league, a 
finer distinction would be drawn between a player’s human capital and his contribution to 
his major league team at varying points throughout the first five years of service to his 
MLB team.     
The empirical analysis incorporated offensive performance data for all Major 
League Baseball players, with minor exceptions, from the years 1991-2000. This analysis 
examined the relationship between offensive performance during the first five seasons of 
service in the major league for players drafted between the years 1989 and 2000 and 
relevant measures of human capital, including level of education and on-the-job training.  
Many people view the game of baseball as a team sport; however, it is truly a 
game of individual performance, especially in the case of the hitter.  A hitter’s 
performance is largely independent of the actions of his teammates but dependent on the 
defensive skills of the opposing team (Dinerstein, 2007).  The primary opportunities to 
score runs are created by hitters; therefore, the main composition of the data consists of 
hitters and their offensive statistics. 
Finally, the theoretical premise to this research study is Human Capital Theory.  
The human capital of each player is analyzed – including but not limited to where each 
individual player received his training, whether he did or did not attend college, and the 
number of years spent developing the skills the professional baseball player required.  
These guided the study, generating and answering a myriad of questions regarding 
various training practices, education, and outcomes. 
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Human capital Theory was not directly tested; rather, this theory was applied to 
the research questions, providing direction to identify and analyze certain variables such 
as education and on-the-job training and how those variables affected the offensive 
performance of MLB players once they were called up to the major league.  According to 
Human Capital Theory, workers who have a higher level of education and experience 
tend to command higher wages and tend to be more productive workers.  Without 
examining the individual wages of each player, the objective was to examine the amount 
of human capital via education and years spent in on-the-job training and the impact on 
future performance these two types of human capital had on a player, comparing the two 
paths travelled.  Therefore, if the previous research findings are valid and can be applied 
to MLB, an MLB team should be more inclined to select a college educated player over a 
non-college educated player, as well as having the expectation that the player will be 
more productive. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  
Introduction to the Problem 
In professional sports, three of the major sports leagues in North America use 
various methods to ensure that the cost of player development is not solely the burden of 
its teams.  For example, in both the National Football League (NFL) and the National 
Basketball Association (NBA), teams have typically been beneficiaries of an existing 
college system that stands on its own financially while providing training at the same 
time. However, MLB teams have a long tradition utilizing minor league affiliates to 
provide the majority, if not all, of the training received by its players.  These minor 
league teams are usually subsidized by the major league parent franchise to which they 
are associated.  In order to recuperate player development costs, MLB players must be in 
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the major leagues for six seasons before they are eligible for free agency.  The reserve 
clause is the period of a player’s career when he is under contract to a team and must play 
for whatever salary that team offers, subject to the league minimum, or not play at all. It 
is also possible for a player’s contract to be purchased before free agency (Depken, 
2002). After six years a player is then allowed to offer his services to any team in MLB.  
Why is this MLB training model so different from that of its counterparts, the NFL and 
the NBA, in being less dependent on colleges and universities to provide its amateur 
players with the majority of their player development.  There continue to be a number of 
potential reasons; because there are fewer games played in both the NFL and NBA that 
leaves time for players to practice; in MLB there are too many games per week for 
meaningful practices thus they need minor league baseball to provide live games for 
player to compete therefore college and the minor league are both substitutes for actual 
practices. 
High school players have a choice of two options once drafted, they can enter 
college and play baseball or enter minor league professional baseball, therefore 
presenting the buyers with multiple additional screening streams (Class A, Class AA, 
Class AAA) in which to evaluate talent.  This is relevant because, unlike the NFL and 
NBA, much more time is spent trying to determine which player is going to have success 
in MLB. In addition, there is a significant cost to running and managing the Minor 
League system and college programs may have the capability of serving as a reliable 
minor league training substitute.   
Many players enter the draft and then decide either to continue their education 
and play baseball in college or to sign an MLB contract with a minor league team.  When 
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a player is drafted directly from high school the team that drafted him has an exclusive 
negotiating right with him.  He can choose to not sign a contract with the team that 
drafted him; however, he cannot sign with another MLB team until he is either redrafted 
or until he makes it through another draft without being selected.  Players who enter the 
draft but subsequently are not selected become amateur free agents and are free to sign 
with any interested team.  High school players selected in the draft can then either choose 
to sign with the team that drafted them and lose their eligibility to play in college or 
choose not to sign with the team and instead attend and play baseball at the collegiate 
level.   
Many players accept the notion that their best time to play professional baseball is 
immediately after high school while they are still young and possess the ability to 
continue with the sport they love.  Others argue that these amateur athletes have the same 
opportunity to turn professional after college.  If the training received in college is similar 
or equivalent to that received in minor league baseball, the amateur athlete might 
continue on to college and diversify his investment in his own human capital by not only 
receiving on-the-job training as he would in the minor leagues but by adding the 
education to his arsenal for future use.  Investing in an education directly after high 
school gives the player a greater chance to increase his non-baseball wages for his future, 
especially if a successful professional baseball career does not materialize. Alternatively, 
players are also faced with the possibility of suffering an injury in college before they 
even reach the professional ranks thus giving the player an increased incentive to bypass 
college and head directly to professional baseball.       
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In comparison to the NBA and NFL draft rules it is important to note the 
following differences in draft policy.  College basketball has long been utilized by the 
NBA as its minor league system.  College basketball helps young players sharpen their 
skills and become more productive players.  According to Groothuis et al. (2007), college 
basketball serves as a signaling device and provides more information about a player to 
NBA scouts.  When players leave college early or do not attend they have less experience 
and a more complicated signal than a player who stays in college.  Furthermore, the team 
that previously made the choice to draft an inexperienced early entrant was taking a risk. 
In the 2006 National Basketball Association Collective Bargaining Agreement (NBA 
CBA) the following rule changes were made: the age limit for entering the draft was 
increased from 18 to 19 years of age; U.S. players had to be at least one year removed 
from high school and 19 years of age (by the end of that calendar year) before entering 
the NBA draft; and international player’s must have turned 19 during the calendar year of 
the draft.  This age requirement in essence forced amateur basketball players to attend 
college for at least one year or more, until they reached the minimum age required to be 
eligible for the NBA draft.  Or alternatively, this rule potentially forced them overseas to 
embark on a new trend, playing in Europe for a year before entering the NBA draft.  
Another possibility these amateur players might realize is that they were not ready to 
enter into professional basketball and that staying in school was their best option. Prior to 
the NBA draft rule changes in 2006, players were drafted once they achieved a certain set 
of skills. This selection was occurring earlier and earlier in their college careers; for 
example, both Kobe Bryant and LeBron James were drafted from high school (Goothuis, 
Hill, & Perri, 2007). However, if they were fortunate enough to be drafted, they signed a 
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contract and began training with the team immediately, unlike MLB where spending time 
in the minor leagues was almost guaranteed.  It must be mentioned that the NBA does 
sponsor a development league as well, and according to the most recent NBA collective 
bargaining agreement, the rules are as follows: during an NBA player’s first two seasons 
in the league (regardless of his age when he entered the league), his team will be 
permitted to assign him to a team in the NBA Developmental League (NBDL). A player 
can be assigned to the NBDL up to three times per season. The player will continue to be 
paid his NBA salary and will continue to be included on his NBA team’s roster (on the 
inactive list) while playing in the NBDL (NBA CBA).  Once again, a clear distinction 
exists in salary –  an NBA player in the Development League receives his full salary and 
does not incur a pay cut or substantial decrease in salary to participate in the 
Development League; however, in the MLB minor league system the salary scale is 
minuscule in comparison.  
Identical to the NBA, the NFL does not draft high school players under any 
circumstance.  According to ARTICLE XVI of the 2006 NFL collective bargaining 
agreement:  
No player shall be permitted to apply for special eligibility for selection in the 
Draft, or otherwise be eligible for the Draft, until three NFL regular seasons have 
begun and ended following either his graduation from high school or graduation 
of the class with which he entered high school, whichever is earlier. For example, 
if a player graduated from high school in December 2006, he would not be 
permitted to apply for special eligibility, and would not otherwise be eligible for 
selection, until the 2010 Draft. (NFLPA CBA, 2006, p.46) 
  
 
8 
The NFL requires players that desire to enter the draft to play college football because it 
is used as a substitute for not having a minor league system to get players prepared for 
the level of competition they will face once they reach the NFL.  After a successful 
college football career, a wealth of information is available on each player that is in 
essence eligible for hire in the NFL via the draft.  The NFL draft is the first opportunity 
each team gets to select players who have been out of high school for at least three NFL 
seasons and these players traditionally come from colleges and universities. Players 
whose high school class did not graduate three or more years before the given draft year 
are not eligible to play in the NFL.  In the NFL draft, the majority of drafted players 
come directly out of college programs as seniors or juniors; though some underclassmen 
are eligible. Players who are drafted and sign a contract begin training with the team 
immediately, once again unlike MLB. 
Unlike the NBA and the NFL, Major League Baseball has the option of drafting 
players one of three ways:  
 High school players, if they have graduated from high school and have not yet 
attended college or junior college; 
 College players, from four-year colleges who have either completed their junior 
or senior years or are at least 21 years old;  
 Junior college players, regardless of how many years of school they have 
completed.  
Teams select players in reverse order of the previous year’s standings, alternating 
between the American League and the National League. With very few exceptions, the 
majority of the players drafted are sent directly to the minor leagues.  However, if a 
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player chooses to go to a four year college or university, he must stay in school for a 
minimum of three seasons before he can then re-enter the draft.  A high school player 
who chooses to play baseball professionally loses his eligibility to play college baseball.  
A player who is eligible to be selected and is passed over by every club becomes a free 
agent and may sign with any interested club until the player enters, or returns to, a four-
year college full-time, or enters or returns to a junior college (Winfree & Molitor, 2007; 
MLB.com).  
Attending college does not end the possibility of a Major League Baseball career; 
attending college means possibly greater earning potential for a non-baseball related 
career.  Not all, but some, of these young men may even have the ability to graduate in 
three years. Moreover, if the athlete does not graduate, and his MLB career does not 
materialize, returning to school to earn a degree is an achievable goal because most likely 
the majority of the credits have been completed. It must be mentioned that within the 
MLB CBA, MLB does offer the College Scholarship Plan.   According to this plan, the 
major league player for whom there is in effect on or after January 1, 1973 a valid and 
unexpired scholarship under the College Scholarship Plan, may commence or resume his 
studies under the Plan at any time within two years after his last day of MLB service. If 
his college studies have not commenced under the Plan within two years after his last day 
of major league service his scholarship terminates. Otherwise, his scholarship continues 
unless he fails to attend college for more than two consecutive years after his last day of 
MLB service without proper reason as set forth in Major League Rule 3(c)(4)(D).  
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Problem Statement 
 There are multiple paths available for amateur baseball players to gain entry to the 
MLB.  For the purpose of this study only those entering via the selection process of the 
MLB draft that are eligible as outlined by MLB rules were included in the study.  These 
players came from one of the following three areas: high school, junior college or four-
year college (Figure 1).  The analysis did not include those players who were not drafted, 
but who signed as amateur free agents and then subsequently made their way into MLB. 
After the selection process is complete, MLB invests in the human capital of those 
drafted by providing additional on-the-job training in the form of the minor league 
baseball experience.  Research is needed to determine how beneficial this investment is.  
Furthermore, conducting research on player development can assist in a better 
understanding as to what the benefits are to attending college versus not attending college 
and entering professional baseball directly after high school. Does the combination of on-
the-job training (OJT) and higher education tell us anything about the human capital 
involved in a successful career in MLB? Finally, does the offensive performance of MLB 
baseball players during any period of the first five seasons in the major league inform us 
about the type of training or combination of human capital (education and/or OJT) 
received prior to being called up? These concerns highlight a need for research on the 
aspects of human capital and its relationship to the player development of MLB baseball 
players.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was first to examine the relationship between a baseball 
player’s human capital and player development, and second to investigate the effect it 
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had on certain offensive performance outcomes once he was called up to the major 
leagues.  By concentrating on the first five seasons of a player’s career we examined how 
his combination of education and on-the-job training influenced him during the early 
portion of his career.  The first five seasons are crucial because it is during this time that a 
player is under the reserve clause; it is when a player is trying to establish himself and 
has not been influenced financially by multi-million dollar contracts, and it is usually 
before a player is deemed a superstar.   
The research built upon an earlier study conducted by Shughart and Goff (1992) 
in which they specifically addressed the following problem: 
Other things being equal, do professional baseball players with college experience 
require smaller investments in training and development by Major League 
Baseball than their counterparts who turn pro after high school?  More 
specifically, do big league ball players who enter the pro ranks from college spend 
less time in the minors, on average, than other athletes who start their pro careers 
with only a high school background?  In short we seek to measure the value of the 
college game to professional baseball by computing the marginal reduction in 
farm system playing time associated with college baseball experience. (p.93) 
In an effort to expand on the Shughart and Goff study and present an additional 
contribution to the area of research that focuses on player development, it is imperative 
that additional research be conducted.  The research questions outlined in the dissertation 
moved the Shughart and Goff study forward by asking questions about these same 
players during the next phases of their careers – the major leagues, by specifically 
including such elements as examining the effects of productivity between amateur 
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baseball players with and without college experience once in the major leagues.  It is 
important to note that this study was not intended to determine the marginal revenue 
product of any player; the aim of the study was to look backwards and evaluate the 
training received by each player regardless of their decision to go to college or not. Also, 
the study did not consider all players called up to the major league ranks, international 
players and those not officially drafted during the MLB draft.  By analyzing what 
previous research has identified as the most informative offense performance statistics 
during the first five years of their MLB career and making a prediction as to who 
provided their MLB team with better output, a player who attended college could be 
compared to a player that did not.   
Research Questions 
RQ1: Do MLB clubs get better production from amateur baseball players taking the path 
from high school to the Minor Leagues to the major leagues or from those with some 
collegiate playing experience? 
RQ2: Is there any difference in the mean time to reach the major leagues for a baseball 
player with only a high school education and a player who attended college? 
 RQ3: What effect does on-the-job training (OJT) have on the following offensive 
performance statistics of MLB players who did not attend college compared to those who 
did: batting average (AVG), runs batted in (RBI), on base percentage (OBP), slugging 
(SLG), and on base+slugging (OPS)? 
RQ4:  Do Major league baseball players who attended/played at a four-year college 
perform better during their first four years in major league baseball than do their 
teammates who do not have any collegiate playing experience? 
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Significance of the Study 
The significance of this dissertation was its contribution to the advancement of 
sport management research in higher education and the contribution of human capital to 
player performance.  By exploring the relationship between data and theory, in this case 
data from MLB and Human Capital Theory, this dissertation tested each research 
question formulated above.  These research questions increase our understanding about 
how sports data reflect the human capital investment made by professional baseball 
players.  In addition, this research assisted in providing an understanding as to how 
education and on-the-job training affect the most transitional and critical years of an 
MLB player’s career the year after being called up and the year prior to free agency.  
While contributing to the advancement of sport research, there are three groups 
specifically that have been identified as potential beneficiaries of the study: MLB teams, 
amateur baseball players, and colleges. 
From the perspective of the MLB teams, the study was significant for numerous 
reasons, including providing the buyer, MLB teams, with valid information to assist in 
the decision to draft or not to draft players depending on the level of education achieved 
by the input, the player.  As the buyer of talent, MLB teams are also able to utilize the 
findings to learn how offensive performance statistics and human capital variables can be 
used to make a prediction about the player development process.  Finally, the findings 
could provide MLB teams with more information about their investment in a player’s 
human capital, namely, the on-the-job training provided by the minor league system it 
currently utilizes. 
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 In addition to being significant to MLB teams, the findings also provided amateur 
baseball players with details about which path to embark upon and whether or not 
attending college makes sense. The player will also be able to understand from which 
education level the MLB teams are acquiring the majority of its players, as well as 
identifying which players are the most successful early in their careers, which will then 
assist in their decision making process whether to attend college or enter professional 
baseball immediately following high school.   
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 Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 The purpose of this chapter is to first provide an overview of professional baseball 
and to introduce some relevant details of the draft process and the minor league system 
within the structure of professional baseball.  The second is to review Human Capital 
Theory (HCT) and establish a thoughtful argument as to how HCT is applicable for 
conducting research on the relationship of the human capital of MLB baseball players 
and their development as players.  Specifically, examining how previous research in the 
disciplines of labor economics and the economics of education have been guided by HCT 
will direct us towards identifying the proper variables that will provide a spotlight on the 
characteristics that a player possesses and which are then labeled as human capital 
variables.  Next, a review of the literature in the area of economics that focuses on sport 
will assist in identifying an existing gap that illustrates why it is relevant to perform such 
an analysis of player development.   
Background of the Draft Process and Minor League System within Professional 
Baseball 
Major League Baseball established the reverse order amateur draft in 1965.  
Participants entering the draft are United States or Canadian citizens that usually fall in 
one of three categories: high school graduates, athletes that have completed their junior or 
senior season in college, or those from junior college baseball programs.  Since 1998, the 
only draft that MLB conducts occurs in June and is known as The First Year Player 
Draft.  Several studies have been conducted examining the impact of collegiate playing 
experience and its effect on the draft (Shughart & Goff, 1992; Spurr, 2001; Winfree & 
Molitor, 2007).   
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The average minor league baseball career length for players who enter directly 
after high school into professional baseball is 4.38 years, and for players who do not 
directly enter into professional baseball and attend college is 1.70 years (Winfree & 
Molitor, 2007).  College baseball players either receive a full or partial scholarship, or no 
scholarship.  The minor league pay structure is at the highest level before the majors. A 
Triple-A first year player earns a minimum salary of $2,150 a month, and after the first 
year is no less than $2,150 a month.  At the next level down, Class AA; first year player 
earns $1,500 a month, and after the first year no less than $1,500 a month. Finally, Class 
A (full season) first year earns  $1,050 a month, and after the first year no less than 
$1,050 a month, while Class A (short-season) first year earns $850 a month, and after 
first year no less than $850 a month (MLBPA, CBA, 2006-2011). 
Human Capital Theory 
Human Capital Theory can help to understand how the professional sports labor 
market rewards the performance attributes of professional athletes (Antonietti, 2006).  
The basic Theory of Human Capital suggests that individuals and society tend to benefit 
economically from investments in people.  Investments can be evaluated in a number of 
ways, including health, nutrition, education, or on-the-job training.  Three of the seminal 
contributors to what is Human Capital Theory today are Gary Becker (1964), Theodore 
Shultz (1963) and Jacob Mincer (1958).  Human Capital Theory tends to be studied 
across many disciplines but traditionally has developed roots within the disciplines of 
economics and education.  As an economic concept, Human Capital Theory has been 
around for several centuries.  There are a number of studies throughout both education 
and economics that examine the relationship between the level of education attained and 
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lifetime wages and between on-the-job training and wages.   As these studies have 
focused on wages, there are three primary themes that consistently reoccur in the 
literature. The first and most utilized is formal education; second is on-the-job training; 
and last is investment in health (e.g. exercise, health care, personal beautification 
expenditures, etc.).  Workers with higher levels of education and more work experience 
tend to have higher wages and increased productivity.  For the purpose of this research, 
the investments in formal education and on-the-job training were the primary focus. 
Human Capital Theory, as outlined by Becker and Mincer, is typically conceived as 
being carried out by individuals acting in their own best interest; therefore, for the 
purposes of this study, the focus was on the primary investment of human capital by the 
individual through formal education and the secondary investment of on-the-job-training 
because workers with a higher level of education and more work experience tend to have 
higher wages because they are more productive (Blass, 1992).  The argument is not that 
one is better than the other, but that each provides a contribution to the study.  Therefore, 
applying the Human Capital Model, an MLB team would want to make an investment in 
a player who has a higher level of education rather than a player that does not.  
Education 
Human Capital Theory deals with acquired abilities and capacities that are developed 
through formal and informal education at school and at home (Antonietti, 2006).  
Formalized education can be defined as education received at the primary, secondary, and 
higher levels, and informal education is defined as at home, work, or in specialized 
vocational training at secondary and higher levels (Sweetland, 1996).   
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Becker, one of the foremost authorities on Human Capital Theory, conducted many 
studies on the Theory.  One of his preliminary studies compared the personal incomes of 
college graduates with those of high school graduates and related the difference in 
income to the cost of attending college (Becker, 1962).  Education is the prime 
investment in human capital.  It is therefore appropriate to assume that education has the 
ability to increase or improve the economic capabilities of people, including athletes 
(Shultz, 1971; Sweetland, 1996).  Sport can be considered as a type of Human Capital 
investment and Human Capital Theory can be applied to understand how the professional 
sports labor market rewards performance attributes of players.  Human Capital Theory 
states that workers with higher levels of education and more work experience, such as 
participating in college baseball programs, tend to have higher wages and higher 
productivity (Antonietti, 2006).   
Applying the Human Capital Model, DuMond et al. (2008) specifically examined the 
choice process of high school football recruits and the benefits of attending college. 
Attending college is assumed to be an investment in human capital that would increase 
the productivity of the recruit or draft choice in the labor market.  This investment in 
human capital may differ from one school to another.  In the case of improvements in 
human capital, there is a difference by school but not because of academic rank of the 
university but more likely because of the number of former NFL athletes the program has 
produced (DuMond, Lynch, & Platania, 2008).   
The educational component of the Human Capital Model allows for many 
unobservable characteristics to be correlated with schooling and to be taken into account 
when considering the addition of a player or worker.  Becker (1962) made it clear that a 
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distinction between schools and firms is not always necessary and in actuality schools 
can be treated as a special kind of firm and students as a special kind of trainee.  It is 
possible that college students do not only work for necessity of income but rather to gain 
more marketable skills that are not readily available in the classroom setting (Light, 
2001).  Individuals may be more apt to take on the role of college student and employee 
because they lack a desire to be categorized into one or the other.  In the case of the NBA 
for example, the Human Capital Model informs scouting departments that teams can 
expect fewer minutes will be played per game during the earlier seasons and rise with 
experience in the league if teams invest in a player’s human capital during his earlier 
years.  Players with at least two years experience in college play more minutes than their 
colleagues with less than one year of college experience (Groothius, Hill, & Perri, 2007).  
According to Groothuis and colleagues (2007), the results support the argument that 
players gain human capital with increased experience in the league.  Furthermore, NBA 
teams are more likely to take a risk by drafting those players that are believed to be future 
all-stars.    
  Athletics aside, the research has shown that if a year of schooling is worth 
completing when a worker is older, it is certainly worth completing when a worker is 
younger (Weiss, 1995).  Investing in a formal education when someone is young allows 
returns to be enjoyed over a longer period of time.   
To illustrate the importance of obtaining an education, several examples from a 
variety of professional sports are available.  In the NFL for example, training consists of 
playing college football in order to reach the NFL draft. Young amateur football players 
make the decision to position themselves to overcome the barrier of entry into the NFL 
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by participating in collegiate football. In addition to developing athletic skills, they are 
investing in human capital by attending college and participating in on-the-job training.   
Another way in which Human Capital Theory has been applied is to analyze the 
human capital transfer they receive from their individual situational circumstances.  
Laband and Lentz (1990) argued that the sons of major league baseball players are the 
recipients of valuable human capital transfer from their fathers; these transfers exist in the 
form of tips and access to scouts, coaches, games, practices, and locker rooms at a young 
age.  Having access to major league baseball experiences such as working on batting 
stance, receiving fielding tips, and strategies about how to pace through a 162-game 
season at such a young age provide the sons of MLB players with a wealth of information 
and knowledge that most other young players would not receive until later in their 
teenage years (if at all). A son following his father into baseball has intimate knowledge 
of the game.  The quality of information and instruction is far superior to the average 
little league baseball player or high school coach.   According to Laband and Lentz 
(1990), this career specific human capital is captured at a relatively low cost to the son of 
the MLB player.  The benefit, however, is higher than if the sons of these players were to 
choose any other profession because of the years necessary for formal education or 
training. 
Labor Training 
 On-the-job training is primary to the Theory of Human Capital because, according 
to Becker (1962) and confirmed by Mincer (1974), it clearly illustrates the effect of 
human capital on earnings, employment, and numerous other economic variables.  
Defining on-the-job training as “the process that raises future productivity and differs 
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from school training in that an investment is made on-the-job rather than in an institution 
that specializes in training,” Becker (1962, p.11) made a strong argument for general 
training and the portion of the cost employers are willing to pay in order to provide it.  In 
contrast, he made the prediction that workers themselves are willing to pay for general 
training by accepting a reduced wage during the training period, an example provided by 
the salary structure of minor league baseball.  
 Specifically discussing MLB, training occurs during the player’s time in the 
minor league system.  Krautman et al. (2000) noted skills taught to players in the minor 
leagues are transferable to other teams, therefore, the initial team that provided that 
training must be able to recoup its investment in general training.  This recovery occurs 
while a player’s team to team movement is restricted under the reserve clause by paying 
them [players] less than their marginal revenue product.  As published in the Handbook 
of Labor Economics (1986), marginal revenue product (MRP) can be defined as the 
change in revenue that results from the addition of one extra unit when all other factors 
are kept equal. The marginal revenue product is used in marginal analysis to examine the 
effect of variable inputs, such as labor, and typically follows the law of diminishing 
marginal returns. As the number of units of a variable input increase, the revenue 
generated by each additional unit decreases at a certain point. It is calculated by 
taking the marginal product of labor and multiplying it by the marginal revenue of a firm. 
In Human Capital Models, wages rise with the length of time spent on a job regardless of 
productivity because that is the environment in which workers tend to learn.  Learning 
tends to occur via two streams either on-the-job training or learning by doing (Blass, 
1992; Weiss, 1995).   
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Training can be categorized as general or firm specific.  General human capital 
includes skills that are learned and have value to many, thereby affecting returns to 
experience, regardless of whether that experience happens to occur at one job or many 
jobs.  The sacrifice on behalf of the employee is receiving wages below his current 
productivity.  However, the benefit would be a future increase in wages because of 
participating in the general training.  In contrast, firm-specific training takes place at one 
employer.  Workers with a specific type of training unique to a certain industry or 
occupation are more likely to remain on the job because their skills would have less value 
in the general labor force.   
 For example, Singell (2001) argued that the amount of playing experience a 
Major League baseball manager has establishes a direct correlation to his team’s ability 
to win games and to the individual performance of his players.  In this two-step process, 
the researcher first examined what portion of the managers direct contribution can be 
attributed to human capital and less to what is typically studied – wages.   Second, the 
researcher evaluated the direct and immediate influence a manager has on a player’s 
performance. In order to evaluate the contribution a manager has on a player, the author 
looked at the player’s performance pre- and post-trade and looked for improvement to 
outputs.   
Another relevant study of Human Capital Theory was conducted by Horowitz and 
Sherman (1980).  The authors measured the relationship between experience and training 
in the productivity of workers, but in the industrial sector of the economy and not 
specifically in sports.  As an alternative to examining wages as a direct measure of 
productivity, the authors substituted output at the work group level as a direct measure of 
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productivity.  The findings of this study suggested that it is possible to use a different 
measure of productivity other than current wages.  In sectors of the economy where 
physical output is unobserved, the productivity of maintenance workers was measured by 
the condition of the equipment it was their duty to care for. 
It is frequently argued that individuals continue to invest in themselves after 
college by choosing to enter into professions that require some type of general training. 
In accepting this path, wages are once again sacrificed in exchange for the higher salary 
that can be commanded once the training has been completed.   This argument mirrors 
what amateur baseball players embark on down their dichotomous training path.   
Previous Research 
This section provides a review of previous and current research areas relevant to 
investing in player development.  The section concentrates on four areas of research: 
education and in-school employment, training cost/investment in player development, the 
draft, and performance.  First, many studies have focused on the advantages and 
disadvantages of working while in school. Even if athletes are not being paid to play, the 
argument is still made that with the amount of hours spent on their sport, it is essentially 
work (Light, 2001; Long & Caudill, 1989; Parsons, 1974).  Second, the investment of 
player development sets the tone for this research study by indentifying how previous 
studies have examined training cost and player development.  Subsequently, the draft is 
an important de facto measure of talent at a point in time and can also be used as a 
control factor. For example Staw and Hoang (1995) looked at the NBA draft and the 
order in which players were selected to predict playing time, trades, and career length in 
the NBA.  Finally performance establishing what the players are worth at different stages 
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in their career makes sense, but having the ability to determine productivity prior to 
introducing the large quantities of money once a player reaches free agency lends to the 
creditability of this study.  The review of these four areas encapsulate the topic of player 
development providing support in identifying the existing gap in the literature for this 
study and its relevance.  
Employment While in School 
 A large body of literature has addressed the issue of how athletics and work 
experience while in college affect academic performance, completion rates, post college 
labor market success, and the decision to enroll in graduate school (DeBrock, Hendricks, 
& Koenker, 1996; Ehrenberg, 1984; Ehrenberg & Sherman 1986; Gee, 1984; Haley, 
1973; Light, 2001; Long & Caudill, 1991; Rumberger, 1979).  
Ehrenberg and Sherman (1986) made the following two assumptions: first, the 
less time spent working the more time the student will have to study and the better he will 
do in college; and second, gaining work experience while enrolled in college helps to 
develop work habits and attributes such as high motivation that make potential employees 
more attractive to employers. Consequently, once someone has successfully completed 
the requirements for a college degree, their wages should be positively correlated to hours 
worked while enrolled in college.  The authors’ findings suggested that the number of 
hours worked, which is typically less than 25 hours per week, had no adverse affect on 
the grade point average of students attending either a four-year or two-year college.  
However, the authors did find that the hours worked had a positive effect on the dropout 
rate and an adverse affect on a student’s ability to graduate on time.  The authors 
provided a plausible explanation for these effects: first, students have a reduced 
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perception as to the value of a college degree; and second, there is an inability to enroll in 
the required number of courses per year due to the amount of hours worked.  The 
Ehrenberg and Sherman study did ignore the following: the effects of loan burdens, 
occupational choice, the choice of college major, and the decision to enroll in 
postgraduate education.  Consistent with the finding of Astin (1975), working off-campus 
was found to have a positive relationship with increased levels of dropping out and 
failure to graduate on time.  Additionally, working on campus was associated with higher 
graduate school enrollment.  In contrast, Long and Caudill (2001) examined the effects of 
participation in college athletics at the varsity level.  By examining males and females 
that attended college during the early 1970’s, not only were the graduation rates of 
athletes during this time period higher than those of non-athletes, the findings also 
suggested that athletic participation may enhance the development of discipline, 
confidence, motivation, a competitive spirit and other subjective traits that encourage 
success.  In addition, when measuring participation in athletics against post-college 
wages, the authors found that males received an estimated 4% higher annual income than 
their non-athlete counterparts.  These studies are consistent with the argument that 
students participating in college athletics spend just as many hours on their chosen sport 
as those students that chose to be employed while in school and garner many, if not more, 
of the same benefits.   
Other researchers have utilized an earnings or wage function to estimate the 
implications of student employment and the relationship between schooling and post 
school wages (Ahituv, Tienda, Xu, & Hotz, 1994; Coleman, 1984; Light, 1998, 2001; 
Michael & Tuma, 1984).  Light (2001) suggested that students might choose to work in 
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order to acquire marketable skills that are different than skills gained in the classroom 
alone. Participating in baseball while in college provides not only the opportunity for a 
MLB career but also some additional of skills not obtainable while in the classroom: time 
management skills, leadership skills, discipline, as well as myriad others.  Additionally, 
by examining the causal effects of post school wages for those in school and time spent 
working at the same time as being enrolled in school, and also controlling for work 
experience, the researchers were able to identify the value of those skills acquired by 
taking part in things outside the classroom.   
Employment while in school was found to have a substantial impact on post 
school earnings.  Light’s main finding was that estimated schooling coefficients were 25-
44% higher when in-school work experience was ignored from the earnings function.  
Simply stated, when others choose to omit in-school work experience there is a 
significantly overstated wage effect for schooling. These findings are consistent with 
Hotz and colleagues, where a positive relationship between post school wages and in-
school employment was eliminated when unobserved factors were taken into account 
(Hotz, Xu, Tienda, & Ahituv, 2002; Light, 2001).  Hotz et al.’s (2002) findings indicated 
that when examined alone, schooling tends to have a greater influence on wages than 
when school and employment while in school are combined.  An additional finding of 
Hotz et al. (2002) was that wages earned after college and employment while in school 
tended to both be determined by unobserved observations which included ability and 
family background.  These findings are consistent with findings from a previous study by 
Rumberger (1979), that college graduates had an economic advantage over high school 
graduates in the labor market.   
  
 
27 
 Building on Light (2001), Molitor and Leigh (2005) examined the effect of 
employment experience gained while in school on the returns to education when looking 
at each level and type of educational institution attended. The findings were consistent 
with other research findings in that when there was a failure to take into account 
experience gained from working while in school the results in returns to schooling tended 
to be overestimated.  Furthermore, by examining the different levels of education, such as 
attending a two-year college where the receiving of a degree may not be the primary 
reason for attending, this overestimation was more likely to occur. 
Training Cost/Investment in Player Development 
 Player development and training costs have not been widely studied and the 
following section reviews the studies (Shughart & Goff, 1992; Winfree & Molitor, 2007).  
Much of the literature is found in economics where baseball salaries have been estimated 
and revenue sharing and competitive balance have been heavily researched (Fort & 
Quirk, 1996; Krautmann, Gustafson, & Hadley, 2000; Scully, 1974, 1989, 1993).  This 
section goes on further to review and make note of where the gap in the literature exists 
in providing the rational for this research study.     
 The following studies set the foundation to extensively examine the topic of 
player development.  It seems to be that research has started to become inquisitive as to 
how players are trained but then moves immediately on to examining the salary structures 
of professional sports teams and players.  Researchers have had remarkable findings as to 
estimating the time frame in which different players are exiting the minor league system 
and the choices they make, but have failed to examine and compare the productivity of 
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college and non-college players to answer the question: “Is there any benefit to spending 
less time in the minors?”    
Winfree and Molitor (2007) used salary and return to education estimates to 
analyze the decision that drafted high school baseball players must make – whether to 
attend college or sign a MLB contract – utilizing a sample of 7,800 high school baseball 
players drafted between 1965 and 1980.  The results of the study suggested that if a 
player was drafted during one of the earliest rounds of the draft and decided to attend 
college, he had a higher probability of being redrafted and receiving a signing bonus; 
however, the findings offer no recommendation as to the amount of the bonus they could 
expect.  The most significant finding related to a player’s lifetime earning potential, 
findings showed that high school players drafted in the earlier rounds could maximize 
their earnings if they signed a professional contract immediately, but if they were drafted 
after the 11
th
 round, the potential to maximize their lifetime earnings were achieved by 
attending college. Furthermore, a player drafted in the earliest rounds was better off 
entering professional baseball regardless of whether the player was from high school or 
college.  In contrast, the team that drafted him had no effect on a player and his decision 
to attend college.   
 While the previous research study addressed the financial value of attending 
college, Shughart and Goff (1992) focused on the length of time spent in the minor 
leagues after the decision was made, the impact of college baseball playing experience on 
player development time in professional baseball’s minor leagues. The findings were 
consistent, however, the approach was different.  This study analyzed data on all major 
league baseball players from one season (715 observations), the 1989 regular season, 
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whereas Winfree and Molitor (2007) chose to analyze multiple seasons.  Additionally, the 
Winfree and Molitor (2007) study only included conclusions as to players choosing to 
attend four year colleges and excluded players that chose to get playing experience from 
junior colleges. This study also utilized a sample of 7,800 high school baseball players 
drafted in the June regular draft between 1965 and 1980 choosing to examine a player’s 
entire career.  Shughart and Goff (1992) found that amateur players who chose to attend 
and play baseball at a four year college advanced to the big leagues faster than their 
counterparts having attended only high school or junior college.  Moreover, they 
supported the argument that players choosing to extend their playing careers by attending 
college benefit major league teams by providing additional screening information as well 
as conserving on the expenses associated with player development. They determined that 
college baseball provides  an important input into the production of major league baseball 
players, and leaves the option open to further analysis of the output of major league 
baseball players based on level of playing experience achieved.  As stated by Rosen and 
Sanderson (2001),  
In the United States, the supply of athletic talent for professional individual and 
team sports comes from two main sources: minor league ‘farm’ systems or tours 
and colleges and universities.  From there outset, professional sport leagues have 
instituted a variety of arrangements or restrictions among owners that affect the 
employment of players and their distribution across teams and impact the supply 
side of labor markets. (p. 19) 
 
Additionally, other economists have performed analyses on the reserve clause, 
salaries, and the effects on training costs (Daly, 1992; Krautman, Gustafson & Hadley, 
2000; Miceli & Scollo, 1999; Rottenberg, 1956).  Examining the effects of the reserve 
clause on training costs began with Simon Rottenberg.  He offered the following 
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argument regarding the reserve clause and invariance proposition.  Without the reserve 
clause teams would be unwilling to invest in player development and training because 
devoid of the ability to suppress wages, how a team would recover their investment from 
those players eventually making it to the majors and for those that never make it to the 
majors is unknown.  Rottenberg (1956) later reversed his argument by stating that even 
without the reserve clause owners would simply discount wages (owners no longer set 
the salary) so in effect the players would then pay for their own training cost.  This would 
be an efficient method for the players as they would find it beneficial because their 
lifetime earnings potential would increase. Minceli and Scollo (1999) offered the 
following in support of the reserve clause and its relationship to training costs and player 
development: if players are interested in achieving the greatest amount of increase in 
salary and expected wealth, they will leave a limited form of player reservation in place 
as this is in their best interest.  The argument is that the reserve clause allows for players 
to honor a commitment to the owners that provided the training for a brief time, allowing 
the owners to not be hesitant in investing in the training and thereby alleviating the 
players from covering their own training cost.       
Krautman et al. (2000) addressed training costs and player development from a 
more traditional approach, that of wages.  The researchers examined monopsonistic 
exploitation, the underpayment of players, as a justified attempt by owners to recuperate 
the expenses of general training.  By outlining a method for estimating the surplus 
extracted from those players restricted by the reserve clause they then determined how 
the surplus was divided among different players.  There were two different types of 
players identified as existing under the reserve clause: players with less than 3 seasons of 
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major league service who were bound to their teams with no recourse when it came to 
their salary; and players with between 3 and 6 years of major league service also bound to 
their team but who were eligible to submit salary disputes through final offer arbitration.  
The results suggested that owners extracted the largest amount from the most productive 
and indentured players -- those with less than 3 years of service and under the reserve 
clause. They estimated this amount to be $3 million dollars per year.  Additionally, the 
results indicated that for those players still under the reserve clause but eligible for final 
offer arbitration (FOA) they were being overpaid.  They offered an explanation that 
owners would rather overpay than go to FOA as an attempt to offer a settlement in order 
to shorten the time that a player spends arbitration eligible, between seasons three and 
six.   
The Draft 
 The MLB draft is the primary source of identifying talent for selection into major 
league baseball.  Baseball America tracks each draft class with latest numbers since 1965. 
During that period, 64.9% of Round 1 selections eventually played at the major league 
level and 41.6% of second-rounders.  Including sandwich picks between the opening two 
rounds, the combined figure was 53.5%. The percentage dropped nearly 10% in each of 
the following rounds to only 12% for Round 5 choices. Finally, rounds 6-10 combined 
was only 15.5%. First-round picks usually guarantee instant millionaire status. Bonuses 
ranged from $845,000 to $3.96 million in 1999, $400,000-$5.3 million in 2000 and 
$900,000-$5.15 million in 2007 (baseball-reference.com). 
College baseball has also been proven to provide additional screening or signaling 
to major league teams about amateur players up to an additional four years.  These 
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additional years of observation are beneficial to both the athlete as well as to the major 
league club owner, the former provides the clubs more information about his skill and the 
latter is twofold: it saves the major league club the expense of providing the training for 
four years and allows a risk to be avoided if the player in fact failed to live up to the 
drafting team’s expectations.  
Predicting the best draft choice between high school players and college players 
has also been a topic of research. Spurr (2000) conducted an analysis focusing on the 
demand side of the baseball draft and the ability to find talent.  The objective of the study 
was to determine if a player’s ability to reach the major leagues varied by the position he 
played or the level of schooling he attained.   The findings suggested that the drafted 
player’s potential for success (ability to reach major leagues) was substantially greater if 
he attended college.   
The analysis also included an evaluation to determine if one team had a more 
superior draft selection process over another and if that process was able to predict future 
major league talent. The author’s findings suggested that no one team has any advantage 
over any other within MLB.  However, he did find that there is a greater propensity for a 
player with college playing experience to make it to the majors more frequently than a 
player with only a high school background, which is consistent with Shughart and Goff 
(1992).  Once again, nothing was taken into consideration in regard to how the players 
performed once they reach the majors, thus leaving the option open for further analysis. 
Performance 
In 1975, a contractual change in major league baseball occurred: veteran players 
not under contract were given the rights to sell their services to other teams within MLB 
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(Scully, 1989).  After six years of service to their major league club, major league 
baseball players become eligible for free agency.  A number of studies have been 
conducted evaluating the correlation between pay and performance (Fort, 1992; 
MacDonald & Reynolds, 1994; Maxcy, 1997; Scully, 1974; Zimbalist, 1992).   
Scully’s (1974) initial study on MLB involved a two step approach: 1) how 
different measures of a player’s offensive performance such as runs scored (RUNS), runs 
batted in (RBI), and strike-to-walk ratio and the market size in which a team was located 
affected a team’s winning percentage; and 2) what effect the team’s revenue had on the 
team’s winning percentage.  The findings suggested that players labeled as average 
received roughly 20% of their marginal revenue product and those players labeled as 
stars about 15% during the days of the reserve clause.   
In additional studies, Scully (1989) and Zimbalist (1992) revisited and updated 
Scully’s (1974) calculations.  By examining players labeled as stars during the 1987 
season, the new results nearly tripled the original study’s calculations in that star players 
were paid between 29% and 45% of their MRP and no longer held to the restrictions of 
the reserve clause but free agency. 
 According to Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005), the new system helped to increase 
player salaries as well as increase the gap between similarly skilled players.  Zimbalist 
(1992) compared two groups of baseball players, those eligible for free agency and those 
not eligible for free agency in 1989. During this season, players with less than three years 
of service were not eligible for salary arbitration or free agency. He found thst the ratio of 
salary actually paid to the marginal revenue product was .38 times what it was for those 
eligible only for salary arbitration and .18 times for those eligible for free agency.  The 
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authors noted that these results only provided for the effects on revenue by evaluating a 
player’s performance statistics effects on winning. 
However, the data show a very close correlation between estimated MRP and 
wages for experienced players that have achieved free agency and have the ability to 
negotiate with multiple teams.  Contrary to popular research, the majority of players do 
not have a record breaking season the year before they are eligible to become a free 
agent.  Research has shown that those MLB players in the year before their free agency 
year typically did not show improvements prior to becoming a free agent.  On the other 
hand, in the same study there was evidence that during the first year of the new contract, 
performance statistics were actually significantly lower than in the year prior to the 
negotiating year, suggesting that if MLB teams pay free agents solely based on the 
performance of the free agent year, they might not be satisfied with the results (Ahlstrom, 
Si, & Kennelly, 1999).   
MacDonald and Reynolds (1994) examined how the changes to free agency and 
final offer salary arbitration have drawn the salaries of MLB players more in line with 
their current marginal revenue product.  The marginal revenue product (MRP) of a 
particular player is the extra price that a spectator is willing to pay multiplied by the 
number of people that are attracted, in person or via television (Rosen & Sanderson, 
2001).  Using publically listed salary data on players on major league rosters from 
August 1986 to August 1987, the findings offered substantial evidence that players with 
more major league playing experience are paid in accordance with their estimated career 
marginal revenue products.  However, younger players, those labeled as rookies, tended 
to be paid less than their actual marginal revenue product.  This runs parallel to whether 
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or not they have met the necessary requirements qualifying them for final offer 
arbitration or free agency. 
  Continuing the investigation of pay for performance economist examined why 
owners were willing to sign players to multiyear multi-million dollar contracts after one 
season of spectacular performance.  Krautman (1990) compared each player’s 
performance in the period right before and right after signing a long term contract and 
found no evidence that the proximity to contract negotiations have any adverse effect on 
performance.  Maxcy (1997) examined players over eight seasons that were currently in 
long term contracts to determine the effects of long-term contracts had any effect on 
player effort or performance. Results are consistent with those in the previous study, 
which indicate the players with long term contracts that are in the season before contract 
renegotiations does not influence performance.  Further, the results showed minimal 
evidence that there was any increase in performance when a player was not in the last 
year of his current contract.        
Harder (1989) also examined performance during the walk year by measuring  
performance using two statistics that are more unconventional than most, runs created 
and total average claiming that these two statistics best measured a player’s contribution 
to his team’s success.  A walk year is defined as the season prior to becoming a free 
agent.  Using data from four seasons, 1976-77 and 1987-88, he concluded that a player 
participating in his contract year had no effect on total average runs created during the 
76-77 seasons and a negative effect in 1989.  For total average he found that there was no 
statistical significance indicating that total average increased during either of the test 
periods.  Therefore, he concluded that a player had no reason to believe that an increase 
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in statistical performance would have any bearing on a higher salary in future years.  
However, Blass (1992) tested the theory that workers were initially underpaid relative to 
productivity and overpaid later in an analysis of MLB, and found that the wages of MLB 
players increased with experience independent of productivity, thereby suggesting that 
MLB players needed to stay consistent to enjoy the wage gains down the line.  
After a thorough review of the literature and the theoretical premises guiding this 
research, it is apparent how Human Capital Theory is applicable to the current research 
project.  Human Capital Theory has directed us toward certain variables that can be used 
to examine the relationship between the theory and the data.  The general conclusion that 
is drawn is that Human Capital Theory points to education and on-the-job training as key 
components of a workers background because worker’s with higher levels of education 
and experience on-the-job tend to be more productive and contribute more to society as a 
whole than those that do not have such a background.  This study set out to determine the 
various outcomes that education and training have on the productivity of major league 
baseball players during the first five years after being called up to the major leagues.  
Human Capital Theory therefore informed this study by acknowledging and affirming the 
importance of education and on-the-job training for people as individuals.  What can be 
done to take these same principles and apply them to MLB players and find the 
measureable impact of these two variables on the early stages of their careers.  The 
review of previous research has identified an existing gap to support the argument of 
moving forward with the current research project.  Salary and performance have both 
been extensively researched; however, the development of players has been virtually 
ignored.  Though previous studies have compared the length of time spent in the minor 
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league system by college players and high school players, no study that has examined 
what happens once they are in the major leagues.  Even if college players spend less time 
in the minor league system, it is possible to go further to compare the productivity of 
these players versus high school players to make a determination as to player 
development.  If it is found that high school players are more productive than college 
players, then maybe college players need to spend more time in the minor league system 
working on the development of their game.  
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Chapter Three: Method 
The goal of this study was to analyze how a player’s human capital influenced his 
major league baseball playing career, specifically his offensive contribution to his MLB 
team, by examining player performance over the first five years after being called up to 
the major leagues.  What type of education a player received (high school, junior college, 
or four year college) prior to being called up to the major leagues was informative about 
this training. It is possible that the source or the path of his training may affect its quality.  
This was determined by analyzing performance in the major leagues as a measure of the 
training quality, controlling for other factors.  The method employed was secondary data 
analysis utilizing two primary sources: mlb.com and baseball-reference.com.  The main 
objective was to document and analyze a player’s level of education, draft year, age, 
location, information regarding time spent in the minor leagues and performance (via 
hitting statistics of all MLB players from the 1990 season through the 2000 season).  All 
information on the players and their performance was based on regular season games.   
Data 
 The sample consisted of amateur baseball players selected in the MLB June 
Regular Draft over eleven seasons covering the years 1990 through 2000.  The data used 
in this analysis came from two primary sources: the official website of Major League 
Baseball (http://www.MLB.com) and Baseball-Reference.com (www.baseball-
reference.com).  Secondary data already exist and require only retrieval and the selection 
of the analytical technique.  Secondary analysis is extremely versatile in that it can be 
applied to studies designed to understand the present or the past, to understand change, 
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make comparison, or to replicate and extend previous studies (Hyman, 1972; Kiecolt, 
1985; Stewart & Kamins, 1993).   
Secondary Data  
Many researchers choose to analyze secondary data over collecting primary data, 
for a number of reasons, including but not limited to the fact that the data already exists 
and in this case is constantly updated.  In addition, by using secondary data one can 
access large amounts of information that might be difficult to obtain through primary data 
gathering methods such as surveys and focus groups.  With the ever evolving reach of the 
World Wide Web and technology, we are afforded with real time up to date access to 
reliable current information. 
Keicolt and Nathan (1984) noted how independent data collection by an 
individual investigator has become increasingly more difficult.  As educators and 
researchers in a climate of declining resources, the state of the economy and educational 
funding has declined in recent years, using secondary data requires less money, less 
people, less time.  Unfortunately, collecting data first-hand requires time, planning, in 
some cases travel, and access.  Secondary data avoids primary data collection problems 
when relying on human subjects.  By using secondary data it is not necessary to be 
concerned about whether or not the test subject will cooperate, obtaining sufficient 
participants, or the amount of noise generated by the experiment or data collection 
procedure. Secondary data allows for a better represented sample, access, and can be 
more readily subject to a variety of research designs and software programs.  Research 
projects conducted using secondary data for analysis are more readily able to be 
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duplicated and expanded on.  When conducting studies requiring data from the past it 
could be nearly impossible to obtain the original data in some circumstances. 
In contrast to the advantages of secondary data, there are several disadvantages as 
well.  The availability of the necessary data can sometimes be difficult to locate or a fee 
might be required to access it. Depending on what the area of research is, the study might 
be based on some general topics that are more readily available than some more specific 
areas the researcher may want to analyze. Time can be both an advantage as well as a 
disadvantage, time is required to collect the data from various archives and this can be a 
very arduous process. In addition, it is not uncommon for incomplete and inconsistent 
information to exist as it may not be on file in its entirety or there is the possibility that it 
might be inaccurate. Inaccuracies can occur because there might be errors that occurred 
in the initial recording of the data or the data quality can create a poorly designed study, a 
poorly coded study, a lack of competent procedures, and missing variables in addition, 
the exact variable a researcher is interested in investigating may not have been recorded 
in the original data.  These are all reasons why primary research is conducted and 
preferred.  It must be noted that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages in terms 
of the necessary information and lack of access needed to undertake this particular 
project. 
Why Use Secondary Data for This Study 
For this particular study the use of secondary data was a suitable choice due to the 
lack of access to MLB and because of the historical nature of the MLB data needed to 
accurately address the research questions.  Therefore utilizing the “Official Site of Major 
League Baseball” MLB.com and trusting the statements put forth on the home page of 
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the website, “MLB.com is committed to you, our fans, to the source of baseball.  We 
want to bring you the most up-to-date, informative and exciting Baseball information on 
the web”, a statement that puts the reliability of the data in perspective.  In addition to 
access, the complicated process, the number of games and the number of players the data 
set encompasses would have required years and many people to collect.  With the 
technological advances of the internet, secondary data was an attractive alternative for 
this study.  MLB.com and Baseball-Reference.com made it possible to conduct a limited 
number of searches for the data needed.  Both sites were readily accessible and fairly 
simply to navigate.  Finding complete information for all draft years used in the study, all 
statistics and up to date biographical information did not present an insurmountable 
challenge.   
Research Design  
Data Description. It is important to note that the data set consisted of regular 
season statistics only and no post-season information.  In order to be included in the 
study, a player must have met all of the following conditions: first, he could not play the 
position of pitcher; second, he had to be drafted instead of being signed as an amateur 
free agent; and third, he must have been called up to the major leagues. 
Pitchers were omitted from the study because of their lack of contribution to 
scoring.  Only in the National League do pitchers hit and in the American League 
pitchers do not hit, except on very rare occasions.  The primary way teams win games is 
by scoring runs and runs are produced by the offensive output of players. Offensive 
players are utilized because there are more of them in comparison to pitchers and more 
detailed performance data.  In addition, players signed as amateur free agents (meaning 
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that they were not drafted) also were not utilized in this study.  Information about a 
player’s level of education and his age at the time of the draft and during each season 
played was a critical part of this research.  Unfortunately, this information was not readily 
available for players signed as amateur free agents. 
While collecting the data a pattern emerged: those players listed as having entered 
the league as amateur free agents primarily resided outside the United States, its 
territories, or Canada and therefore were not eligible for the draft as outlined by the rules 
of MLB.  According to Chiba (2004), from 1995-1999 approximately 90% of foreign-
born players in MLB were of Latin American origin.  It is widely accepted that in 
addition to operating and supporting minor league teams, many teams also operate 
baseball academies in foreign countries such as the Dominican Republic, Venezuela and 
Japan at a cost upwards of 60 million dollars. There is much more untapped, cheaper and 
much easier to sign talent in these countries (Chiba, 2004).  In 2003, major league 
baseball had representation from 16 countries, consisting of more than 200 players born 
outside the United States on 25-man rosters and the disabled list at the beginning of the 
season (SportsIllustrated.com, 2003).  Amateur free agents and baseball academies from 
around the world were outside the scope of this dissertation.  Finally, the criteria to play 
minor league baseball are not nearly as difficult as playing in the major leagues.  This 
study made a comparative analysis of player development by utilizing a combination of 
variables, and one of those variables included total seasons spent playing in the minors. 
The data from mlb.com yielded 5,408 observations. The variables obtained from 
mlb.com included: position played, games, at bats, runs, hits, doubles, triples, homeruns, 
runs batted in, total bases, base on balls, strike-outs, stolen bases, caught stealing, on base 
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percentage, slugging, batting average, sacrifice flies, hit by pitch, intentional walks, total 
plate appearances, extra base hits, stolen base percentage, and on base percentage plus 
slugging (terms are defined in Appendix A) for each player each season.   The next step 
in this process was to augment the data from mlb.com with information from the second 
data source, baseball-reference.com which is an online clearinghouse of up-to-date sports 
statistics and history that goes beyond baseball.  The information gathered from baseball-
reference.com included: birth year, draft year, draft round, education, first and last year in 
the major leagues, players still active and total career length.  Baseball-reference.com 
provided substantial information; however, areas of missing data were also brought to the 
forefront.  Missing data was identified for, last year in the major leagues, which occurred 
because a player was currently still active and his career had yet to conclude, which 
coincided with the missing data for total years in the major leagues. Baseball-
reference.com was unable to provide complete information on education for some players 
but the missing information was available at mlb.com. The information included: player 
full name, draft pick number, in which round they were drafted, and the name, location, 
and institution they were selected from.  This information provided the ability to fill in all 
missing data for level of education.  Because this study was only interested in MLB 
players drafted between 1990 and 2000, all players drafted prior to 1990 were omitted for 
this study, leaving approximately 1600 observations.  Over the course of the eleven 
seasons of offensive performance data collected, many of the players were not drafted 
between the identified years of 1990-2000 because they were active players during those 
seasons their statistics were in the data, and those 3808 were eliminated.  
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Many of the players competing in MLB were not drafted.  In accordance with the 
rules set forth by MLB with regard to the draft, a player is eligible for the draft if he is a 
resident of the United States, its territories or Canada, has never signed a major league or 
minor league contract, or is in high school in the U.S regardless of where he was born.  A 
player is labeled as an amateur free agent if he enters the draft and goes unselected. He 
may then sign with any club as an undrafted free agent. Additionally,  those players who 
are not eligible for the draft because they do not meet the criteria to enter the draft, for 
example they are residents of other countries, were, are not part of this study. These 
players were identified in the data set as AFA meaning they signed with the club as an 
amateur free agent and were not selected in the draft.  Approximately 600 players were 
identified as AFA and subsequently not chosen for this study, leaving the data set to be 
analyzed containing 1384 observations.  Observations were collected each year a player 
was active in the major leagues between 1990 and 2000. Since 1994 was a strike year, all 
observations in that year were omitted, totaling approximately 47. Finally, there were 
players who were in the major leagues for less than five years during the sample period.  
These players were either injured, released, retired, sent back down to the minors, still 
playing beyond the year 2000, quit, or deceased leaving, a sample of 560 observations for 
this study (N=112).  
In preparing the dataset for analysis one final elimination of variables occurred 
leaving the dataset with the following performance variables: games (G), at bats (AB), 
runs (R), hits (H), doubles (2B), triples (3B), home runs (HR), runs batted in (RBI), total 
bases (TB), base on balls (BB), strike outs (SO), caught stealing (CS), on base percentage 
(OBP), slugging (SLG), batting average (AVG), sacrifice flies (SF), hit by pitch (HBP),  
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intentional walks (IBB), grounded into a double play (GDP), total plate appearances 
(TPA), extra base hits (XBH), stolen base percentage (SB%) and on base plus slugging 
percentage (OPS).  The data set was reduced from an initial 29 performance variables to 
23.  The six variables excluded were: fly out/ground out ratio (GO/AO), fly outs (AO), 
ground outs (GO), number of pitches (NP), sacrifice hit (SH), and stolen bases allowed 
(SB).  These variables were excluded because they did not contribute to a players’ 
offensive performance as it related to this study. 
Sample Characteristics. The sample included information about all MLB players 
classified as hitters from the 1990 through 2000 seasons.  The sample was restricted to 
those drafted between the 1990 and 2000 seasons, and for the purposes of this study, only 
the first five years of a player’s career were examined. The choice was made to only 
examine the first five years of a player’s career because of the rules about free agency.  
Player mobility is restricted in MLB; there is a contractual reserve clause that prohibits 
players from negotiating contracts for their services with any league member except their 
current team which was a mandated provision within a player’s contract until 1976 
(Maxcy, 2002).  Starting with the 1977 Basic Agreement, and outlined in the current 
Basic Agreement, players with 6 or more years of MLB service are eligible to become 
free agents and negotiate with other teams at the expiration of their current contract 
without any restrictions or qualifications (2007-11 CBA, MLBPA). This study asserted 
that after five years in MLB any prior training or player development (minor leagues or 
college) would no longer be influential to the players they became in year six.  In year six 
players take on the traits and learned behaviors of being in the league and begin to 
become more predisposed by free agency and money.  
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The sample consisted of all MLB players who were drafted between 1990 and 
2000 and were called up to the major league level.  These years and their corresponding 
numbers represented how many players were in the study during the eleven year time 
period. For example, there were approximately 50 players drafted in 1990 and 53 players 
drafted in 1991, however the first year a player from the 1990 cohort was called up to the 
major leagues was 1992 and there were four: Bret Boone, David Hulse, Dan Wilson, and 
Kevin Young.  Therefore, Figure 1 reflects no observations for the years 1990 or 1991. 
The number of players by education who were called up to MLB from 1990-2000 is 
shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 1. Number of Players Called Up to Major Leagues in Draft between 1990-2000 
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Figure 2. Number of Players by Education and Called Up to MLB from 1990-2000 
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Based on the information gathered from the literature review there were two 
human capital characteristics identified for the study: level of schooling obtained and 
years of on-the-job training.  One measurement of human capital for the players in the 
sample was level of education and it consisted of three categories: high school only, 
junior college, or four-year college.  Players labeled as high school only are players at the 
time of their draft year who were selected with a high school education only. Many 
players enter the draft immediately after high school to see where they are selected and 
then make the decision to go to college. For example, Barry Bonds was drafted in the 
second round of the 1982 amateur draft by the San Francisco Giants coming out of high 
school, and he did not sign.  Instead he attended Arizona State University for three years 
and reentered the draft in 1985 and was selected number six in the 1
st
 round by the 
Pittsburgh Pirates (MLB.com, 2007).      
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The next measurement of human capital, on-the-job training (OJT), was defined 
by two variables.  The first was the previously identified education variable - specifically 
the four-year college category.  When an athlete decides to attend and play baseball in 
college under the rules of MLB he must stay for at least three seasons, therefore the 
college variable can be utilized for both measurements of human capital.  The second 
variable (MiLB), was the total number of seasons each player in the sample spent in the 
minor league system before getting the call up to the major leagues.   
This data set spans eleven seasons of major league baseball performance statistics, 
1990 – 2000; the data is both time series and cross-sectional.  Data characterized as time 
series data are measurements of a variable taken at regular intervals over time.  Cross-
sectional data is parallel data collected on many individuals at a given time. Panel data 
contains multiple observations over multiple time periods.  The data set for this study was 
in actuality an example of an unbalanced panel data set because individual characteristics 
including demographics (age, education attainment, employment status), performance 
statistics, team, draft information (team, year, round), and player information (position 
and career length) were collected for different persons and different years and not all 
players were observed in the same years.  The data is right censored because not all 
observations have an end point.  Many of the players are still active and were still playing 
in MLB after the 2000 season.  
Data Coding. It was necessary to code six variables.  Level of education was 
initially coded as discrete where ‘1’ stood for high school, ‘2’ for junior college and ‘3’ 
for four year college, and ‘4’ for unknown.  However, it seemed far more efficient to 
create indicator variables for each level of education, therefore, three new indicator, or 
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dummy, variables were created: high school = 1 vs. non high school = 0, collegetyr = 1 
vs. not collegetyr = 0 and collegefy = 1 vs. not collegefy = 0.  The variables Team and 
Position were qualitative and coded on a nominal scale, since no team was considered 
better than the other nor was one position of greater magnitude than the other (hence, 
these are not ordinal variables).  For the team variable, the teams were arranged in 
alphabetical order then assigned a number 1-30 representing the number of teams in 
MLB during the study timeframe (Table 1). 
Table 1. Teams in Each MLB League 
National League American League 
Arizona Diamondbacks Baltimore Orioles 
Atlanta Braves Boston Red Sox 
Chicago Cubs  Chicago White Sox 
Cincinnati Reds Cleveland Indians 
Colorado Rockies  Detroit Tigers 
Florida Marlins Kansas City Royals 
Houston Astros Los Angeles Angels 
Los Angeles Dodgers Minnesota Twins 
Milwaukee Brewers New York Yankees  
New York Mets Oakland Athletics  
Philadelphia Phillies  Seattle Mariners 
Pittsburgh Pirates Tampa Bay Rays 
San Diego Padres Texas Rangers 
St. Louis Cardinals   
Montreal Expos*   
* The Montreal Expos entered Major League Baseball as an expansion team in 1969 and relocated to Washington D.C., 
December 3, 2004 and were renamed the Washington Nationals. 
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The team that drafted the player into MLB was also recorded and followed the 
same nominal scale as the team variable.  The variable position was coded in accordance 
with the scoring rules of major league baseball and after elimination of the position of 
pitcher, the combination of the three outfield positions and the addition of the designated 
hitter, 2-8 remained.  The nominal scale was as follows; catcher (2), first baseman (3), 
second baseman (4), third baseman (5), short stop (6), outfield (7) and designated hitter 
(8) (Table 2).   
Table 2.  
Positions by Coded Number  
MLB Positions Number StudyPosition Number 
*Pitcher 1 Catcher 2 
Catcher 2 First Base 3 
First Base 3 Second Base 4 
Second Base 4 Third Base 5 
Third base 5 Short Stop 6 
Short Stop 6 *Outfield 7 
*Left field 7 DH 8 
*Centerfield 8   
*Right Field 9   
 
The last variable that was coded was an indicator variable for active players. The active 
variable indicated if the player was still currently an active major league baseball player 
as of the year 2000 and was coded as ‘1’ for active and ‘0’ for no longer active.   A 
complete list of all variables is presented in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
Data Analysis  
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Data were analyzed using the PAWS statistical software package (version 18.0: 
SPSS, Chicago, IL, U.S.A.). Before the actual analyses, the data were explored for 
accuracy of entries, missing data, and statistical assumptions. Data analysis procedures 
included basic descriptive statistics, two independent sample t-tests or Mann-Whitney 
tests, linear regression, life table, and Cox proportional hazards regression. Two 
independent sample t-test or Mann-Whitney test (depending on normality of the variables 
as checked by Shapiro-Wilk test at 1% level) was performed to compare the differences 
in performance between subjects with high school education and some college education.  
Linear regression was used to determine whether education, OJT and other 
independent variables (such as age, team drafted, round drafted, certain offensive 
performance statistics, years in the minors for an amateur baseball player once he was 
called up to the big league, position dummy variables) predicted the offensive production 
(AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS) in MLB and the mean time to reach the major leagues. 
Position were grouped into catcher (number 2), infielder (number 3,4, 5, 6) and outfielder 
(number 7)  and further dummy coded into three new variables. The two (infielder and 
outfielder) of the three new variables was included in the linear regression model with 
catcher was used as the reference category. Life tables were used for time-to-event (end 
of MLB career) comparisons between high school players and players with some college 
education. Cox regression analysis was used to determine the effect of various factors 
(age, education, team drafted, round drafted, certain offensive performance statistics, 
years in the minors for an amateur baseball player once he is called up to the big leagues, 
position) that were thought to be associated with failure of MLB career.  
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Research Questions 
This chapter asserted that through the combination of the human capital variables 
(on-the-job (OJT) training while in college and the amount of schooling attained) the 
more productive a MLB player is going to be as measured by his offensive performance.  
In order to test this assertion six hypotheses were developed and were tested using 
statistical methods.  The study focused on the following research hypotheses.  
H1:  
H0: β1 = 0 Education (high school vs. some college) does not significantly affect 
offensive performance (AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS) in MLB 
H1: β1 ≠ 0 Education (high school vs. some college) significantly affects offensive 
performance (AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS) in MLB 
H2 
H0: β2 = 0 On the job training (OJT) does not significantly affect offensive performance 
(AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS) in MLB 
H1: β2 ≠ 0 On the job training (OJT) significantly affects offensive performance (AVG, 
RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS) in MLB 
H3: 
H0: β3 = 0 Education (high school vs. some college) does not significantly affect the 
mean time to reach the Major Leagues for a baseball player  
H1: β3 ≠ 0 Education (high school vs. some college) significantly affect the mean time to 
reach the Major Leagues for a baseball player  
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H4 
H0: βi = 0 for all independent variables (i.e., age, education, team drafted, round 
drafted, certain offensive performance statistics (AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS), years 
in the minors) on the survival of MLB.  
H1: at least one of the βi ≠ 0 for all independent variable (i.e., age, education, team 
drafted, round drafted, certain offensive performance statistics (AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, 
and OPS), years in the minors) on the survival of MLB.  
H5 
H0: The overall survival is not different between high school players and players with 4 
year or junior college  
H1: The overall survival is different between high school players and players with 4 year 
or junior college 
Assumptions and Limitations  
In linear regression it is assumed that the data meet the following assumptions: 
homoscedasticity, linearity and normality.  The assumption of homoscedasticity states 
that the variability for one continuous variable is roughly the same at all values of another 
continuous variable, which was tested by Breusch-Pagan test. The assumption of linearity 
is important because regression analysis only tests for a linear relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable.  If the relationship between the 
variables is not linear, the linear regression will not be able to identify a non-linear 
relationship between the DV and IV(s). 
  In regression analysis it is sometimes assumed that the unobservable equation 
error term is normally distributed. A normality test check can be done in multiple ways. 
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The two most popular,  examination of the histograms of the dependent variables or 
checking the Q-Q plot. The residuals for survival data are different than for other types of 
models because of censoring. Though the Cox regression model is non-parametric to the 
extent that no assumptions are made about the form of the baseline hazard, there are still 
a number of important issues which need be assessed before the results can be safely 
applied in this setting. First is the issue of non-informative or random censoring.   To 
satisfy this assumption, the design of the underlying study must ensure that the 
mechanisms giving rise to censoring of individual subjects are not related to the 
probability of an event occurring. The second key assumption in the Cox model is that of 
proportional hazards. This means that the survival curves must have hazard functions that 
are proportional over time (i.e. constant relative hazard), which can be evaluated using 
"log-log" plots in the two-sample comparison case. The major limitation of all regression 
techniques is causality.  Regression analysis ascertains statistical relationships and not the 
underlying causal mechanism.  
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Chapter Four: Results 
This study first examined the relationship between a MLB baseball player’s 
human capital and player development, and second investigated the effect a player’s 
human capital and education level had on certain offensive performance outcomes once 
he was called up to the major league.  By concentrating on the first five seasons of a 
player’s career the following was examined how a player’s combination of education and 
on the job training have influenced him during the early portion of his career. Four 
research hypotheses were developed.  The independent variables were education track, 
OJT and other potential predictors which were thought to impact the offensive 
performance outcomes and the mean time to reach the major league. In addition, the 
study aimed to explore what influenced MLB career longevity. Two additional research 
hypotheses were developed in order to examine whether the overall survival in MLB 
depended on various factors such as age, education, team drafted, round drafted, certain 
offensive performance statistics, years in the minors for an amateur baseball player once 
he was called up to the big league and whether players with some college had a higher 
chance of survival than high school players.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows, first the data demographics are 
presented describing the information gathered on all MLB players included in the study.  
Second, the summary of findings for each of the research questions and hypotheses was 
provided in detail and finally the conclusion of what it all means is offered at the end of 
the chapter. 
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Demographic Characteristics of the study population  
The study consisted of 112 male MLB players drafted between 1990 and 2000.  
All of these players were aged 18 – 23. The educational background of the population by 
year they were drafted is presented in Table 3. Of the 112 MLB players, 35 (31.3%) 
players were drafted with only a high school education and 77 (68.8%) players were 
drafted from a four year or two year college or university then to minor league baseball 
before being called up to the major league.  The average time to reach the major league 
appeared to be 3.29 years. The average round a player was drafted in was 7.53. The 
average years in minor league was 3.29 with a minimum of 1 year and maximum of 6 
years. The average OJT (years in minors plus college) was 3.87 years with a minimum of 
0 year and maximum of 9 years. The average total seasons played during1990-2000 were 
6.29 seasons with a minimum of 4 seasons and maximum of 9 seasons. The descriptive 
statistics for various performance variables is shown in table 4. All playing positions with 
the exception of pitcher are represented in the sample.    
Table 3 
Education background of the population by year they were drafted (N=112) 
 
Draft Year High School College Total 
1990 14 18 32 
1991 13 26 39 
1992 5 18 23 
1993 3 8 11 
1994 0 6 6 
1995 0 1 1 
Total 35 77 112 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for various performance variables (N=112) 
Variable Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum 
Games 80.146 30.836 81.400 13.000 149.400 
At Bats 254.148 133.009 237.100 28.000 581.800 
Runs 36.241 22.803 31.400 3.000 97.600 
Hits 69.239 41.037 60.900 5.000 162.400 
Home Runs 6.786 5.500 5.500 0.200 23.400 
Runs Batted In 32.227 19.984 27.900 1.800 87.200 
Total Bases 106.673 64.238 93.100 7.800 279.400 
Base on Balls 24.323 15.605 20.000 2.400 66.600 
Strike Outs 46.246 22.376 45.000 8.200 103.800 
On Base Percentage 0.323 0.039 0.325 0.204 0.454 
Slugging 0.387 0.070 0.385 0.220 0.601 
Batting Average 0.255 0.036 0.260 0.155 0.370 
Total Plate Appearances 285.038 149.741 262.300 32.800 656.800 
On Base plus Slugging 0.710 0.100 0.704 0.424 1.055 
 
Hypotheses testing 
The data were then analyzed using various statistical methods to test the six 
research hypotheses. The following sections provide findings for these hypotheses.  
Descriptive statistics was performed for offensive performance by education 
(Table 5). The results demonstrated that the players taking the path from high school to 
the minor league to the big league had slightly higher average offensive production 
scores (AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS). Box plots displaying the relevant information 
of offensive production is shown in Figure 4. The box plots showed that the distribution 
of AVG, OBP, SLG and OPS was very similar for high school players and players with 
some college education. The distribution of RBI  
is more spread for high school players than players with some college education. 
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Two independent sample t-test or Mann-Whitney test depending on normality of 
the variables (checked by Shapiro-Wilk test at 1% level) was performed to compare the 
differences in performance between subjects with high school education and some 
college education. AVG, OBP, SLG, and OPS were normally distributed (p>.01) while 
RBI was not normally distributed (p<.01). Therefore, two independent sample t-test was 
applied to AVG, OBP, SLG and OPS while Mann-Whitney test was applied to RBI. The 
results demonstrated that the players taking the path from high school to the minor league 
to the major league had slightly higher average offensive production scores (AVG, RBI, 
OBP, SLG, and OPS) (Table 5). However, significant difference was only found in RBI 
(U=1705.00, p=.025). There were no significant difference in AVG (t (110) =.55, p=.58), 
OBP (t (110) =.28, p=.78), SLG (t (110) =1.08, p=.30), and OPS (t (110) =.84, p=.41) 
between players with high school education and those with some collegiate education. 
The results supported the null hypothesis for AVG, OBP, SLG and OPS while were in 
favor of alternative hypothesis for RBI.  
Multiple regression was performed to the test the first two hypotheses. Multiple 
regression tested the effects of the two main independent variables: education and OJT 
and other potential predictors (age, team drafted, round drafted, years in the minors, 
position dummy variables) on dependent variables offensive production (AVG, RBI, 
OBP, SLG, and OPS). Backward elimination procedure was used in order to obtain a 
reduced model containing only meaningful variables. No variables were entered into the 
model for OBP, SLG, and OPS. Therefore, only the full model is presented for these 
three dependent variables. For AVG, the reduced model contains only the variable 
infielder, β=.012, t (109)=3.26, p=.07. This suggested that players labeled with the 
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infielder position had higher AVG than catchers. For RBI, age significantly predicted the 
RBI, β=-2.846, t (108)=-2.45, p=.016, which suggested that as age increased by one year, 
the RBI was expected to decrease by 2.846 unit .   The infielder position also 
significantly predicted the RBI, β=10.802, t (108=3.03, p=.003), which suggested that 
players labeled with the infielder position had significantly higher RBI than catchers.  
The estimate of coefficients and regression statistics is shown in Tables 6-12. The results 
supported the null hypothesis that neither education nor OJT significantly affected the 
offensive performance.  
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Offensive Production by Education (high school (N=35) vs. 
some collegiate (N=77) 
Variable Education Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum 
AVG 
High School 0.258 0.041 0.261 0.155 0.370 
Some collegiate 0.254 0.034 0.259 0.162 0.320 
RBI 
High School 38.869 21.747 33.200 1.800 82.800 
Some collegiate 29.208 18.497 25.200 3.200 87.200 
OBP 
High School 0.325 0.045 0.326 0.225 0.454 
Some collegiate 0.323 0.036 0.325 0.204 0.403 
SLG 
High School 0.398 0.077 0.405 0.226 0.601 
Some collegiate 0.383 0.066 0.379 0.220 0.558 
OPS 
High School 0.721 0.115 0.716 0.480 1.055 
Some collegiate 0.704 0.093 0.703 0.424 0.924 
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Figure 3. Boxplot for Offensive Production by Education (high school (N=35) vs. some 
collegiate (N=77)) 
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Table 6 
Multiple Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors on Batting Average (AVG) (full 
model) 
 
  B SE T p-value 
(Constant) 0.273 0.136 2.004 0.048 
Age -0.001 0.007 -0.149 0.882 
Education 0.009 0.019 0.481 0.631 
OJT 0.001 0.003 0.213 0.832 
Years in the Minor Leagues -0.005 0.004 -1.195 0.235 
Team that drafted player 0.000 0.000 -0.587 0.559 
Round Players was drafted in 0.000 0.000 1.045 0.299 
Infielder 0.019 0.010 1.812 0.073 
Outfielders 0.008 0.011 0.748 0.456 
Note. R2=.063, F (8,102)=.86, p=.55 
 
Table 7 
Multiple Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors on Batting Average (AVG) 
(reduced model) 
 
  B SE t p-value 
(Constant) 0.249 0.005 54.084 0.000 
Infielder 0.012 0.007 1.807 0.074 
Note. R2=.029, F (1,109)=3.26, p=.07 
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Table 8 
Multiple Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors on Runs Batted In (RBI) (full 
model) 
 
  B SE T p-value 
(Constant) 61.011 70.177 0.869 0.387 
Age -1.333 3.403 -0.392 0.696 
Education 3.630 9.784 0.371 0.711 
OJT -0.526 1.504 -0.350 0.727 
Years in the Minor Leagues -2.059 1.956 -1.053 0.295 
Team that drafted player -0.149 0.228 -0.653 0.516 
Round Players was drafted in -0.048 0.228 -0.210 0.834 
Infielder 14.411 5.381 2.678 0.009 
Outfielders 5.258 5.574 0.943 0.348 
Note.R
2
 = .165, F (8, 102) = 2.53, p =.02 
 
Table 9 
Multiple Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors on Runs Batted In (RBI) 
(reduced model) 
 
  B SE T p-value 
(Constant) 85.057 23.923 3.555 0.001 
Age -2.846 1.163 -2.448 0.016 
Infielder 10.802 3.563 3.032 0.003 
Note. R
2
 = .13, F (2, 108) = 8.16, p =.001 
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Table 10 
Multiple Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors on On Base Percentage (OBP) 
 
  B SE T p-value 
(Constant) 0.381 0.148 2.571 0.012 
Age -0.003 0.007 -0.356 0.723 
Education 0.000 0.021 -0.001 0.999 
OJT 0.000 0.003 0.043 0.966 
Years in the Minor Leagues -0.003 0.004 -0.793 0.429 
Team that drafted player -0.001 0.000 -1.138 0.258 
Round Players was drafted in 0.001 0.000 1.038 0.302 
Infielder 0.015 0.011 1.364 0.176 
Outfielders 0.007 0.012 0.599 0.550 
Note.R
2
 = .044, F (8, 102) = .59, p =.79 
 
Table 11 
Multiple Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors on Slugging (SLG) 
 
  B SE t p-value 
(Constant) 0.552 0.263 2.103 0.038 
Age -0.007 0.013 -0.587 0.559 
Education 0.018 0.037 0.502 0.617 
OJT 0.003 0.006 0.533 0.595 
Years in the Minor Leagues -0.011 0.007 -1.553 0.124 
Team that drafted player -0.001 0.001 -0.752 0.454 
Round Player was drafted in 0.000 0.001 0.508 0.612 
Infielder 0.023 0.020 1.133 0.260 
Outfielders 0.010 0.021 0.463 0.644 
Note.R
2
 = .055, F (1, 109) = .75, p =.65 
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Table 12 
Multiple Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors of On Base + Slugging (OPS) 
 
  B SE t p-value 
(Constant) 0.955 0.378 2.529 0.013 
Age -0.011 0.018 -0.610 0.543 
Education 0.015 0.053 0.291 0.771 
OJT 0.003 0.008 0.411 0.682 
Years in the Minor Leagues -0.014 0.011 -1.362 0.176 
Team that drafted player -0.001 0.001 -0.947 0.346 
Round Player was drafted in 0.001 0.001 0.740 0.461 
Infielder 0.039 0.029 1.333 0.186 
Outfielders 0.015 0.030 0.516 0.607 
Note.R
2
 = .054, F (8,102) = .73, p =.66 
 
The time to reach the major league was computed as the time taken by a player to 
reach the major league from the year he was drafted (i.e., year player was called up-year 
drafted). Descriptive statistics was performed for the time to reach the major league by 
education (Table 13). Boxplots displaying the distribution of the mean time to reach the 
major league by education level (high school or attended college) were included to 
visualize the data (Figure 5). The boxplot showed that the distribution for players that 
have some college education is more spread than the distribution of high school players.  
Multiple regression was performed to the test the hypotheses 3. Multiple 
regression tested the effects of the main independent variables: education and other 
potential predictors (team drafted, round drafted, position dummy variables) on the 
dependent variable mean time to reach the major league for a baseball players. The 
results demonstrated that the overall model was significant (R
2
 = .179, F (5,106) = 4.63, 
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p=.001) ), which suggested that the predictors explained 17.9% of the variance in mean 
time.  The estimate of coefficients is shown in Table 14. The results demonstrated that 
education, round a player was drafted in, and outfielder position significantly predicted 
the mean time to reach the major league. In particular, the estimated coefficient for 
education is .77 (p<.001) suggesting that when education level is changed from college 
(coded as "0") to high school (coded as "1"), it is expected that the mean time to reach the 
major league is increased by .77 years. The estimated coefficient for round drafted was 
0.035 (p=.003) suggesting that when round is increased by 1 unit, the mean time to reach 
the major league is increased by 0.035 years. In addition, the estimated coefficient for 
outfielder is -.713 (p=.016) suggesting that the players in outfielder position spent a 
shorter time to reach major league than the players in catcher position.  
 
Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics for Mean Time to Reach the Major League by Education (high 
school (N=35) vs. some collegiate (N=77)) 
 
Variable Education Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum 
Mean 
time 
High School 3.66 1.16 4.00 1.00 6.00 
Some collegiate 3.10 1.01 3.00 1.00 6.00 
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Figure 4. Boxplot for Mean Time to Reach the Major League by Education (high school 
(N=35) vs. some collegiate (N=77)) 
 
 
Table 14 
Multiple Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors on Mean Time to Reach the 
Major League (full model)  
 
  B SE T p-value 
(Constant) 3.642 0.329 11.082 <.001 
Education 0.772 0.213 3.624 <.001 
Team that drafted player -0.022 0.012 -1.822 0.071 
Round Players was drafted in 0.035 0.011 3.073 0.003 
Infielder -0.503 0.283 -1.776 0.079 
Outfielders -0.713 0.290 -2.459 0.016 
Note.R
2
 = .179, F (5,106) = 4.63, p=.001 
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Life table and Cox regression (Cox Proportional Hazards Modeling) was used to test the 
hypotheses 4 and 5 and to estimate the proportion of high school players vs. players with 
some college education survive, past their first season in the major league, their 2nd 
season, their 3rd season, their 4th season and finally on to their 5th season. Survival 
analysis, including life table and Cox regression, is a way of examining the time to an 
event for one or more groups.  In the present study, the event of interest is the end of 
MLB career for a player. The advantage of survival analysis is it accounts for cases 
where data about the terminal event is unavailable (censored) due to study cut-off dates. 
For example, the data in the present study is “right-censored” since many players 
continued to play beyond the sampled dates. Life table was used to calculate the survival 
function (i.e., the proportion of the population who were still in MLB in a given time 
interval). Cox regression model was used to determine how career length of a MLB 
player was affected by several explanatory variables. The final model from the Cox 
regression analysis yielded an equation for the hazard as a function of several explanatory 
variables. The assumptions of survival analysis are that censored and uncensored cases 
do not differ in terms of the likelihood of the terminal event does not depend upon when 
the time of the entry event.  In Cox's model no assumption is made about the probability 
distribution of the hazard. However, it is assumed that the hazard ratio does not depend 
on time. In the present study, these assumptions were fulfilled. The advantage of life 
table is being able to make a credible analysis without knowing the exact times of 
censoring. However, life table is not efficient in handling withdrawals, which could be a 
source of bias. In addition, the choice of the interval is arbitrary. The method assumes 
that withdrawal occurs at mid-interval which may not be the case. The advantage of Cox 
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regression is it can incorporate multiple qualitative and quantitative factors, while the 
limitation is it does not accommodate variables that change over time. 
The life table analysis results showed 100% of the high school players and players 
with four year or junior college survived the first three seasons. The proportion of 
surviving for high school players for the fourth season was still 100%, while it decreased 
to 99% for players with four year or junior college. The proportions of surviving for the 
fifth season were 97% for both high school player and players with four year or junior 
college. The results showed there is no significant difference in the overall survival 
between high school players and players with four year or junior college, Wilcoxon 
(Gehan) statistic (1) = .18, p = .68. The Plot of survival for high school players and 
players with some college education is shown in Figure 6.  
Cox regression was performed to determine the effect of age, education, team 
drafted, round drafted, certain offensive performance statistics (AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, 
and OPS), and years in the minors, and player's position on overall survival of MLB. The 
offensive performance statistics were added in the model one at a time.  
The results showed that the overall models were not significant. The parameter 
estimates and regression statistics are listed in table 15-19. The offensive performance 
statistics (RBI, SLG, and OPS) had a significant effect on the survival of MLB. The 
hazard ratio (exp(β)) was less than 1 for the three variables, which suggested that the 
players with a better offensive performance tend to have longer careers in MLB. None of 
the other independent variables appeared to significantly predict the survival of MLB 
(Table 15-19). The findings supported the hypothesis that the overall survival is not 
different between high school players and players with 4 year or junior college.  
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Figure 5. Plot of Survival for High School Players (denoted by green line) and Players 
with Some College Education (denoted by blue line) 
 
 
 
Table 15 
Cox Regression Coefficients for various predictors and AVG on overall survival of MLB  
 
  B SE Wald p-value 
Age -0.194 0.616 0.099 0.753 
Education -1.257 1.865 0.455 0.500 
Team that drafted player 0.002 0.048 0.002 0.966 
Round Players was drafted in -0.066 0.070 0.898 0.343 
Batting average (AVG) -15.540 10.453 2.210 0.137 
Years in Minor Leagues 0.058 0.411 0.020 0.887 
Catcher     0.797 0.671 
Infielder 10.368 157.129 0.004 0.947 
Outfielder 11.062 157.128 0.005 0.944 
Note.χ2 (8) =6.11, p=.635 
  
 
70 
 
Table 16 
Cox Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors and RBI on Overall Survival of MLB  
 
  B SE Wald p-value 
Age -0.019 0.543 0.001 0.972 
Education -0.442 1.736 0.065 0.799 
Team that drafted player 0.010 0.050 0.042 0.838 
Round Players was drafted 
in 
-0.068 0.067 1.036 0.309 
Years in Minor Leagues -0.023 0.425 0.003 0.956 
Catcher     0.342 0.843 
Infielder 10.907 167.854 0.004 0.948 
Outfielder 11.370 167.854 0.005 0.946 
Runs batted in (RBI) -0.079 0.040 3.986 0.046 
Note.χ2 (8) =8.90, p=.351 
 
 
Table 17 
Cox Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors and OBP on Overall Survival of MLB  
 
  B SE Wald p-value 
Age -0.190 0.620 0.094 0.759 
Education -1.335 1.873 0.508 0.476 
Team that drafted player -0.003 0.049 0.004 0.948 
Round Players was drafted in -0.060 0.070 0.724 0.395 
Years in Minor Leagues 0.069 0.396 0.030 0.863 
Catcher     0.674 0.714 
Infielder 10.410 151.959 0.005 0.945 
Outfielder 11.059 151.958 0.005 0.942 
On base percentage (OBP) -14.301 10.071 2.017 0.156 
Note.χ2 (8) =5.97, p=.651 
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Table 18 
Cox Regression Coefficients for Various Predictors and SLG on Overall Survival of MLB  
 
  B SE Wald p-value 
Age -0.171 0.554 0.095 0.757 
Education -1.272 1.695 0.563 0.453 
Team that drafted player 0.004 0.048 0.006 0.938 
Round Players was drafted in -0.090 0.075 1.426 0.232 
Years in Minor Leagues 0.032 0.420 0.006 0.939 
Catcher     1.287 0.525 
Infielder 10.634 147.197 0.005 0.942 
Outfielder 11.532 147.197 0.006 0.938 
Slugging (SLG) -16.846 6.892 5.974 0.015 
Note.χ2 (8) =9.73, p=.285 
 
Table 19 
Cox Regression Coefficients for various predictors and OPS on overall survival of MLB  
 
  B SE Wald p-value 
Age -0.218 0.597 0.133 0.715 
Education -1.373 1.779 0.596 0.440 
Team that drafted player -0.008 0.048 0.025 0.875 
Round Players was drafted in -0.070 0.070 0.997 0.318 
Years in Minor Leagues 0.046 0.418 0.012 0.913 
Catcher     0.712 0.701 
Infielder 10.790 141.561 0.006 0.939 
Outfielder 11.463 141.560 0.007 0.935 
On base + slugging (OPS)  -10.391 4.727 4.832 0.028 
Note.χ2 (8) =.654, p=.372 
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Discussion 
 Finding prospects is critical for any professional sport. MLB has invested 
significant resources in player selection process (Olson & Schwab, 2000). Yet, decisions 
regarding whom to scout, whom to draft, whom to promote, whom to acquire, etc are still 
difficult.  One of the major selection philosophies is focusing on college players is a more 
sensible strategy as the return on investment of college prospects is higher because they 
are more predictable and reach the majors faster. However there are counterarguments as 
evidences were also found that performance of high school players are comparable to 
college players. Therefore, one of the main aims of this study was to examine the impact 
of college education on the outcomes of the early stages of a professional baseball 
player’s career.    
 According to the Human Capital Theory, educational investments and on-the job 
training will make a player more productive. By attending and playing baseball in 
college, a player might develop into a more rounded individual who is more cognizant of 
team goals and committed to sacrificing personal statistics for wins. This was supported 
by several previous studies (e.g., Spurr, 2000; Newman, 2003; Lee, 2010). The main 
arguments are college players are more mature, which enable them to better handle the 
stresses of competition at the major league level. Second, college players play against 
stronger and more advanced competition more often than high school players and they 
play a longer schedule and usually practice year round (Lewis, 2003). Finally, college 
players may go off the board more quickly than high school players.  The age, experience 
and maturity contribute to shorter incubation periods for college prospects: two years 
from draft to the majors for top players drafted from college, as opposed to three-and-a 
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half to four years for top players drafted from high school (Law, 2007). Therefore, a 
college player is considered as a better investment than a high school player. Such 
drafting strategy is the well known Beane's risk-averse philosophy (Lewis, 2003), and is 
being shared by a number of general managers (GMs) and top management teams 
(TMTs), such as Marlins scouting director Jim Fleming (Newman, 2003). Contradicting 
this philosophy, however, a study conducted among 30 college players and 30 high 
school players (Wassermann et al., 2005) revealed no significant differences in two 
offensive statistics (on base percentage and OPS) between these two groups of players. 
The study argued the results may be yielded due to several reasons. First, high school 
players may adapt more easily to new changes and college players may have developed a 
certain approach to hitting from college that contradicts a new approach at the 
professional level. Second, high school players are usually placed in lower levels of 
minor league baseball than their counterparts college players, which in turn may even the 
offensive statistics. Similarly, another study noted that attending college could be viewed 
as a negative signal because a player is not focusing all of his time on being drafted 
(Olbrecht, 2007). Furthermore, for some of the best high school prospects, college is not 
an option as many do not have the academic ability to gain entry into college and players 
who go to college do not necessarily receive good instruction as they are used in a way 
that is designed for winning more games, not in a way that maximizes the player’s 
professional development (Law, 2007).  
In the present study, out of a sample of 112 players drafted between 1990 and 
2000, 35 (31.3%) players were drafted from high school and 77 (68.8%) players were 
drafted out of college. This indicated that managers shared the Beane's risk-averse 
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philosophy to favor college players over high school players as college players were 
drafted more than twice as many as high school players during this period. Similarly, of 
the 2999 players drafted in the 2004 and 2005 first year player entry drafts, 1978 (66%) 
were from college (MLN Sports Group, 2005). However, the tendency to choose college 
players over high school players was not supported by further findings of the present 
study.  Using linear regression, the present study tested the effect of education on five 
offensive performance measures (AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS). The results showed 
that education did not significantly affect any of these the offensive performance 
statistics. In fact, high school players even had a slightly higher mean offensive 
performance than college player although a higher variability was also observed in high 
school players than college players. Several factors may contribute to the non-significant 
results. First, the study was based on relatively small sample size (N=112). A more 
significant result could have been established if much larger data set was used. Second, 
the overall performance of a player may be difficult to quantify using individual 
performance data.  
Nonetheless, the analysis showed that there is a positional difference in terms of 
the offensive performances, namely, players in the infield position had better batting 
average (AVG) and runs batted in (RBI) percentages than catchers. In addition, age 
significantly predicted the RBI. Further investigation is needed to verify whether the 
positional difference in performance can be generalized to a larger population. Human 
Capital Theory was also tested on the mean time to reach the major league. It was 
expected that if Human Capital Theory was taken into account, the mean time to reach 
the major league would be shorter for a college player than a high school player since 
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college is expected to experience a tougher competition and have a higher maturity level 
which gives them a better chance of reaching the majors faster. The results of the present 
study showed that the mean time to reach MLB for high school players was about half 
year longer than players with some college education. Furthermore, the regression 
analysis showed that education significantly predicted the mean time to reach MLB. 
Specifically, when education level is changed from college to high school, it is expected 
the mean time to reach the major league is increased by .77 years. The results also 
suggested that it took from one year to six years for both high school and college players 
from draft year to reach the major league. On average, it took 3.10 years for college 
players while 3.66 years for high school players to reach the major league. The variability 
as measured by standard deviation was higher for high school players than college 
players, indicating high school players are slightly more unpredictable than college 
players. These results are consistent with previous findings (Burger et al., 2006; 
DelGrippo, 2010; Law, 2007). In a previous report, Law (2007) suggested that college 
players were faster to the majors than high school players. It only took two years from 
draft to the majors for top players drafted from college, as opposed to three and a half 
year to four years for top players drafted from high school. Another report  (DelGrippo, 
2010) also showed similar trend in that top high school players could take up to five or 
six years to make an impact, whereas highly rated college players (namely pitchers) can 
make a team better much sooner.  Likewise, Burger and Walters (2009) examined first-
round picks taken in the 1990-1997 drafts and found that it took high school players who 
ultimately became ‘stars’ 2.44 years from the time they were drafted to reach the major 
league; it took college players who became stars 1.97 years to reach the majors. It took 
  
 
76 
high school draftees who became ‘good’ players 3.56 years, while only 1.84 for college 
players who became good big leaguers. High school players who became ‘regular’ big 
leaguers took 4.31 years to reach the major league compared to 2.25 years for college 
draftees who became regulars to reach the majors. In addition, the results showed that 
when round is increased by 1 unit, the mean time to reach the major league is increased 
by 0.035 years and the players in outfielder position spent a relatively shorter time to 
reach major league than the players in catcher position.   
 To summarize, the results are mixed. On one hand, the results support the Human 
Capital Theory and Beane’s drafting philosophy since education showed a positive effect 
to shorten the time to reach major league. On the other hand, the results contradict these 
two theories as college players did not show superior offensive performances than high 
school players. This finding is consistent with an analysis performed by Van Zandt 
(2006), who compared the rate of success of the players on Beane’s list against that of all 
41 first-round picks from 2002 and found that Beane’s choices are lagging behind in 
terms of performance.  The study further compared Beane’s picks against the top high 
school picks from the first round and found that again, Beane’s choices did not compare 
favorably and with the A’s draft picks an average of 3.5 years older than the high school 
draftees they were not likely to catch up either. The present study provided additional 
evidence with respect to drafting strategies. Success in baseball performance may be in 
large part determined by ability and training and there may not be a universal draft 
strategy. Therefore, it is more beneficial to evaluate players comprehensively instead of 
an all-college approach.  
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Another important determinant, on-the-job training (OJT) was analyzed in the 
present study in order to further test whether Baseball performance is determined by OJT. 
The OJT was defined by two variables in the present study.  The first was the previously 
identified education variable but specifically the four-year college category.  When an 
athlete decided to attend and play baseball in college under the rules of MLB he must 
stay for at least three seasons, therefore the college variable can be utilized for both 
measurements of human capital.  The second variable (MiLB), accounted for the total 
number of seasons each player in the sample spent in the minor league system before 
getting the call up to the major league.  Therefore, OJT is a variable measuring the 
number of years in college and in the minor league and reflect both the player's education 
and training. The effect of OJT on the offensive performance was tested using regression 
analysis. The results demonstrated that OJT did not significantly affect any of the five 
offensive performance measures, which contradict the Human Capital Theory. Based on 
Human Capital Theory, individuals tend to benefit from on the job training, and thus may 
have better offensive performance. For example, Singell (2001) showed that the amount 
of playing experience a major league baseball manager has, establishes a direct 
correlation to his team’s ability to win games and to the individual performance of his 
players.  Results also showed that players drafted in a later round will be faster to reach 
the majors. Specifically, a player drafted about 29 rounds later will enable him to reach 
the majors one year sooner, which requires further investigation.  
The results demonstrated that more years of on-the-job training did not improve a 
player's offensive performance. Multiple factors may contribute to such findings. For 
example, years of training may not be the best variable to represent on-the-job training 
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since large variations exist in training intensity, training methods, and training types (film 
specific or general), etc.  
 In addition to evaluate offensive performance and mean time to reach MLB, the 
present study explored the career longevity of a player using survival analysis. An 
understanding of the factors affecting career longevity is useful in modeling the effects of 
demographic changes on various outcomes. Previous studies demonstrated that age, 
player performance and era affected baseball career longevities. In particular, age has an 
inverse effect on career longevity in that players who started at younger ages will enjoy 
longer careers (Shulz et al., 1994). Moreover, players on the extremes of first-year 
performance will have vastly different career longevities. Spurr and Barber (1994) 
suggested that the first year is critical in the evaluation of a player’s talent so the worst 
players will have exceptionally brief careers and the best players will enjoy long careers. 
Finally, eras with fewer teams will have more players who will witness shorter careers 
than eras with league expansion. Drawing from these previous researches, the present 
study examined the effect of age, education, team drafted, round drafted, certain 
offensive performance statistics (AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS), and years in the 
minors on career longevity of baseball players. The career longevity was defined as the 
years remaining in majors and the study only focused on early stages of a professional 
baseball player’s career. Specifically, Life table and Cox regression was performed to 
determine the proportion of higher school players vs. players with some college 
education who survived the first five seasons and the effect of various factors on the 
survival of players in major league. The results indicated a similar proportion of players 
with high school education and college survived their first five seasons and there is no 
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significant difference in years remaining in majors between high school and college 
players. The Cox regression further demonstrated that players with a better offensive 
performance (RBI, SLG, and OPS) tend to have a longer career in MLB. None of the 
other independent variables appeared to significantly predict the survival of MLB. 
Conclusion 
This study addressed the effects of education and on the job training on the 
performance of professional baseball players using a dataset including 112 players 
classified as hitters from the 1990 through 2000 seasons. Specifically, the effect of 
education and on the job training on offensive performance measures, mean time to reach 
Major League Baseball was tested with linear regression and the effects of multiple 
factors (age, education, team drafted, round drafted, certain offensive performance 
statistics (AVG, RBI, OBP, SLG, and OPS), and years in the minors) on career longevity 
was tested using Cox regression. Overall, the results demonstrated that education 
significantly affects the mean time to majors, while neither education, nor on-the-job 
training significantly affects the offensive performance. It was also found that positional 
differences exist in a few offensive performance measures.  
Finally, results demonstrated that the survival of the major league was 
significantly affected by several offensive performance statistics (RBI, SLG, and OPS), 
however was not significantly affected by other factors  (age, education, team drafted, 
round drafted, certain offensive performance statistics (AVG, and OBP), and years in the 
minors).Taken together, these results suggested that due to difficulties and potential 
pitfalls the MLB managers are facing in choosing among so many highly uncertain 
prospects, it is more beneficial to fully explore a player’s potential by multiple 
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performance factors instead of using universal strategy that is merely based on the 
Human Capital Theory. 
  
  
 
81 
Chapter Five: Practical Implications 
The study is designed to provide empirical evidence of the factors which affect 
early stages of a professional baseball player’s career. A practical implication arising 
from this study is that there is no universal draft strategy. It is more beneficial to fully 
explore a player’s potential by multiple performance factors instead of merely relying on 
human capital. The present study demonstrated that education shorten a player's 
accession into the major league, however neither education, nor on-the-job training 
significantly affect the offensive performance of 112 players drafted between 1990 and 
2000. It was also found that the survival of the major league was significantly affected by 
several offensive performance statistics (RBI, SLG, and OPS), however was not 
significantly affected by other factors (age, education, team drafted, round drafted, 
certain offensive performance statistics (AVG and OBP), and years in the minors). The 
present study adds to a growing body of literature on understanding the effect of human 
capital to player performance. From the perspective of the MLB teams, the study is 
significant in helping managers to develop a more effective drafting strategy.  The 
present study also benefits the amateur baseball players with providing details that help 
them to make better decisions in their professional careers. The attempt of assessing 
which attributes have predictive effects on the career duration of the players yields some 
implication for the drafting process. It is useful for clubs wishing to evaluate trades of 
established players for draft picks.  
Limitations  
Certain limitations are present within this study. First, the study used a data set of 
112 players drafted between 1990 and 2000. A potential limitation is that it only included 
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a limited number of players in a certain time period. Therefore, results may not be 
generalizable to other settings. In order to overcome this limitation, it would be necessary 
to conduct more comprehensive research which could involve the replication of this study 
in a number of different settings or with a much larger data set. Second, foreign born 
players that entered MLB as amateur free agents were not included because the study was 
limited to those players that graduated high school in the United States or graduated high 
school in the United States and attended a college or university and were drafted by MLB 
during the June regular draft. Some of the players that were not included were from 
countries including Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and other South 
American countries where players are placed in academies at a young age. The rules for 
entry into MLB players from countries other than the USA do exists and can include such 
factors as age, education, and training. 
Future Research 
The present study only focused on the effect of education and on-the-job training 
on early stages of a professional baseball player’s career. Additional investigation may be 
warranted to reveal other important factors. For example, the present study showed that 
the round players drafted significantly affected the mean time reaching the majors. A 
further study could investigate this in more details. Further investigation with a much 
larger data set is also recommended in order to reveal the general trend with more 
statistical power. Finally, a study that examines foreign born players and the training that 
they receive in the baseball academies as compared to the level of training players in the 
United States receive prior to entering the minor leagues or the major leagues is an area 
of interest. 
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Appendix  
yob Year of birth 
age Age at the time player was drafted 
observ_yr Year in which the observation was recorded 
strike_yr 1994 was a strike year. Dummy variable coded as 0 for no and 1 for yes 
tm_code Team player was on during observation year. Coded 1-30 
drft_yr Year player was drafted 
drft_tm Team that drafted player during the June Regular Draft 
drft_rd Round in which player was drafted 
collegefy Drafted from a four year college variable.  Dummy code 0 no/ 1 for yes 
hs Drafted from high school. Dummy coded 0 for no and 1 for yes 
collegety Drafted from 2 yr college. Dummy coded 0 for no and 1 for yes 
milb Minor league baseball seasons.  Total years spent in the minors 
frst_yrmj First year in the major leagues 
lst_yrmj Last year in the major leagues 
active Active. Is the player still playing major league baseball as of 2000 
tot_seas Total seasons spent in major league baseball 
pos Position played on the field 
g Games. Total number of games played in observation year 
ab At bats. Total number of at bats during the observation year 
r Runs. Total runs scored during the observation year 
h Hits.  Total number of hits during the observation year 
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doubles Total number of doubles hit during the observation year 
triples Total number of triples hit during the observation year 
hr Home runs.  Total number of home runs hit during the observation year 
rbi Runs batted in for each observation year 
tb Total bases 
bb Base on balls.  Walks 
so Strike outs 
sb Sacrifice bunts 
cs Caught stealing. 
obp On base percentage 
slg Slugging 
avg Batting average 
sf Sacrifice flies 
sh Sacrifice hits 
hbp Hit by pitch 
ibb Intentional base on balls. Intentional walks 
gdp Grounded into a double play 
tpa Total plate appearances 
xbh Extra base hits 
sb_perc Stolen base percentage 
ops On base + slugging 
 
